

Forum suisse pour l'étude des migrations
Rue des Terreaux 1
Tél. 032 718 39 20



Schweizerisches Forum für Migrationsstudien
CH-2000 Neuchâtel
Fax 032 718 39 21

The resettlement of refugees

An analysis of the Swiss experience in the international context

by

Andreas Wimmer

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1 Introduction

Since the fifties, Switzerland belongs to those Western states that have put a certain number of resettlement places at the UNHCR's disposal each year. This measure is aimed at bringing to a safe third country those refugees from UNHCR camps who are in greatest need. Switzerland also admits groups of refugees outside this quota, at the request of the UNHCR or other international organizations, in especially dramatic cases of refugee distress. In both cases, they are granted refugee status in accordance with Article 22 of the Swiss Asylum Act without having to pass through individual asylum proceedings.

This admission policy has been in a state of crisis for some years. There are various reasons: the admission of a great number of persons from former Yugoslavia in need of protection, general difficulties involved with execution in the sphere of asylum, rising numbers of refugees in need of support as well as saving measures in the public sector; all these factors have contributed to question existing policy. As a consequence, in spring 1996 the Federal Council rejected the admission of 300 Iraqi refugees proposed within the quota by UNHCR and the Federal Office for Refugees. At the same time a working group was constituted with the task of thoroughly reconsidering current policy.

The Federal Office for Refugees entrusted the Swiss Forum for Migration Studies with the task of compiling a basic paper that would prepare discussion in this working group and collect the most important points required as a basis for decision making. The objective of this paper is to evaluate Swiss policy and practice and to create a foundation for discussion on various courses of future action. In particular, the following questions are to be answered:

A Study of the international context

- Of what significance is the admission of quota refugees for Swiss foreign policy? What is the relationship between the system of quotas on the one hand and the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland, its relations to the UN and its global asylum policy on the other hand?
- How does the Swiss practice differ from that of other countries providing UNHCR with quotas for the admission of groups of refugees?
- How is the UNHCR's policy evolving, which concepts are governing its actual practice and what is the significance of current discussions on the so-called Nordic Initiative, which originally foresaw giving increased help to countries of first asylum instead of resettling refugees?
- What are the consequences for Swiss quota policy of changes in the global structure of conflicts (end of the Cold War, multiplication of local conflicts in some regions in the South, war in the former Yugoslavia)?

B Analysis of Swiss admission policy

- What is the relationship between asylum practice in Switzerland as a whole and the admission of quota refugees? What consequences do the increase in asylum migration and the execution crisis have on quota policy?
- How are the criteria governing the selection of quota refugees in Switzerland to be assessed, taking into account humanitarian objectives, the process of integration, the total costs as well as interdependencies with asylum policy in general?
- How efficiently have admission procedures so far been organized between the FOR, the voluntary relief agencies and UNHCR? How successful have efforts at integration been so far?
- What costs are incurred in the present admission and integration practice?
- What are the interests and political values behind current discussion on a continuation or modification of the existing policy?
- How do the admission and integration policies of other countries compare with Swiss practice? How are we to estimate the effectiveness of the different models?

C Evaluation of possible courses of action

- How can we assess the scope for manoeuvre of a future policy? How can we judge the various options for future action with regard to their chances of being realized as well as their inherent advantages and disadvantages for Swiss foreign and domestic policy as well as for Swiss asylum, financial and integration policies?

The present report has been structured in accordance with the questions formulated above. A first part is devoted to the study of the international context and UNHCR policy; the second part focuses on the Swiss experience, while the third part deals with various possible courses of action. Each part is divided into several chapters, at the end of which a short conclusion is given.

The basic question as to whether and in what form Switzerland is to continue providing UNHCR with quota places cannot, of course, be answered without recourse to value judgements: how much weight is to be attributed to humanitarian considerations in face of financial and political aspects or domestic policy arguments? What does humanity actually mean to us? Such questions can only be answered within the framework of a discourse that is both moral and political - and not by a scientific analysis in a strict sense. Analysis can merely point out a) the basic political principles that have defined the policy so far, b) whether these basic principles have maintained their validity or have changed their meaning, and c) how a certain decision can be judged from the point of view of various principles. In this sense, the present study follows the logic of a historical analysis: we will ask about the fundamental concepts and political ideas that have governed the development of the Swiss practice in order

to ascertain whether, in the meantime, these political guidelines have shifted and what the consequences for the future would be.

Reading the questions formulated above makes it quite clear that the problems involved are of a highly complex nature. Many of the topics mentioned have hardly been tackled so far and the data for answering questions of central importance are not available. The present study is therefore of a somewhat exploratory character. Some questions can only be answered in a temporary and non-definitive manner, others more conclusively. Nevertheless, we hope that the report will be able to prepare discussions in the working group and to clarify some of the controversial points. Even if it cannot anticipate the result of the discussions or show a path it will, we hope, contribute to solving certain questions in advance and to structuring the decision-making situation more clearly.

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A The international context

2 The resettlement of refugees within the global political context of the post-war era

The history of the internationally co-ordinated resettlement of refugees has a long tradition.¹ It began between the wars with the resettlement of 45,000 White Russians who had fled to China after the Russian Revolution. In the thirties, a number of organizations were involved with the resettlement of Jews fleeing from Germany. The forerunner of UNHCR, the International Refugee Organization, was exclusively devoted to the resettlement of persons displaced by the Second World War. From 1947 to 1951, more than a million persons were taken to a new home country, most of them emigrating overseas. UNHCR also commenced its activities by dissolving refugee camps from the Second World War.²

The following UNHCR resettlement operations clearly show how they were characterized by Cold War logic: anyone that succeeded in fleeing from an inhumane Communist regime should, as a matter of course, be admitted to the "free world". Due to the confrontation between the blocs within the UN system, there was no thought of tackling the problem of the responsibility borne by countries of origin. For propaganda reasons, and because skilled labour was welcome for post-war reconstruction, a return policy was hardly given any serious consideration.³

In 1956, 200,000 Hungarians fled to Yugoslavia and Austria. In 1972, Idi Amin expelled the Ugandans of Asian descent and, within a few months, 40,000 Asians were resettled in 25 countries. Following the Chilean Revolution of 1973, those true to the Allende Government fled together with others who had before found refuge in Chile from the dictatorships in neighbouring countries. In all, 5,000 Chileans were resettled in 19 countries. The largest operation carried out by UNHCR, however, was the resettlement of 700,000 Vietnamese in the decade following the fall of Saigon in 1974.

The end of the Cold War has led to a reorientation of resettlement policy: new regional conflicts have arisen in the South without the involvement of the great powers; there has been a corresponding lack of ideological-political motivation for comprehensive resettlement operations. Return to the country of origin has been revalued as an option and resettlement in a third country has been defined as the last possible solution exclusively for persons in special need of protection or for humanitarian hardship cases.⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, strategic interest in specific refugee groups has also rapidly waned, the onset of asylum migration as well as growing xenophobia in Western Europe and North America have likewise contributed to resettlement's loss of attractiveness. Today, therefore, in the world's domestic policy, prime attention is given to the prevention of conflicts, temporary protection and voluntary return to the country of origin. This change in the order of priorities can be documented by means of well-founded figures: in 1979, at the zenith of refugee movements from South-Eastern Asia, permanent resettlement in safe third countries was seen as the only

solution for five per cent of the world's refugee population under UNHCR's mandate. According to UNHCR⁵, 3 per cent of those refugees were actually resettled in 1980. By 1994 this proportion had drastically changed: only 1 per thousand refugees was foreseen for a resettlement program.

According to the new global constellation of conflicts, there are several small groups from various continents in need of resettlement today. These are refugees from countries of first asylum which, for example, have not signed the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which have agreed to admit refugees only provided they are later resettled in third countries or which cannot guarantee the safety of the refugees.⁶

Thus, in the nineties, resettlement corresponds more to the humanitarian principles in whose service it had always officially stood. However, political motives still play a rôle in the decision as to which groups of refugees are to be resettled *in toto*. This is shown by the example of the Iraqi refugees who, as victims of Saddam Hussein's regime, are considered to be allies in accordance with the friend-enemy pattern and are being resettled in their tens of thousands. From a structural point of view they today take the place formerly held by the Vietnamese refugees; as allies of the Western Powers, encouraged by the latter to rise up against the regime and later to flee, they become privileged recipients of the "calculated kindness"⁷ of international aid campaigns after the failure of the rebellion. In contrast, no such solution has been sought for the Rwandans in Zaire, the Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, for Sri Lankans, for the Tibetans in Nepal and India, for the East Timorese or West Papuans.

Conclusion 1

Since the end of the Cold War, the policy of a worldwide co-ordinated resettlement of refugees may still be influenced by geopolitical alliances, in particular of the United States, but we can no longer today speak of a clear political appropriation as at the time of the East-West confrontation. Today, groups from many different conflict regions with very different political backgrounds are proposed for resettlement by UNHCR.

In Western countries, the readiness to admit groups of refugees is no longer governed by the friend-enemy pattern of the East-West confrontation but, as shown by the example of Bosnia, it depends, as well as on the above-mentioned political alliances, on the geographical proximity of the conflict, the cultural affinity to those fleeing as well as the intensity of media attention given to the conflict.

As a worldwide organization, UNHCR can best guarantee that all conflict regions in the world will continue to be given consideration irrespective of such ranking lists and that protection in Western Europe will also be given to persons who are not "lucky" enough to be involved in a conflict that is of central importance and visible for the Europeans. Today's resettlement policy recognizes humanitarian and universalistic criteria rather more than formerly, and therefore accommodates a small neutral country like Switzerland, which places a value on her humanitarian tradition in foreign policy.

3 The development of UNHCR policy

3.1 Experiences with Indochina and new orientation following the end of the Cold War

Having given a brief outline of changes in UNHCR's international rôle, we will now take a closer look at the development of the resettlement program itself. The experiences with Indochina marked a decisive turning point.⁸ At the zenith of the Cold War and after a military engagement without precedent on the part of the USA, the introduction of resettlement programs was intended to show solidarity with the Allies, who were under the threat of Communism, and to bring those fleeing to a safe haven in the West.

The fifteen-year-long experience with the Indochina campaign led to a general disillusionment regarding the use of resettlement as a policy instrument. UNHCR personnel found themselves involuntarily caught up in a gigantic migration mechanism. The operation got more and more out of hand as the possibility of resettlement began to have a pull effect. The guarantee of admission to the West exercised a magnetic power. The so-called Orderly Departure Program was developed in order to save economically motivated migrants the passage over the water. However, this reinforced the tendency on the part of many host countries to confuse immigration and refugee policies.

According to a UNHCR evaluation report, this disillusionment had a negative effect on the implementation of later resettlement programs. The low prestige of involvement with resettlement led to the task being relegated to younger employees, who were hardly sufficiently qualified for the work. This resulted in the selection of cases being executed in a disorganized fashion, which in turn led to a loss of goodwill in the governments, which for their part were endeavouring, via quota policy, to legitimize their support of UNHCR vis-à-vis their own populations.

After the Vietnam campaign, the fundamental conflict of interests between UNHCR and the host countries became even more obvious: UNHCR is primarily interested in relieving the refugee camps in its care of "problematic" groups of people. The governments of host countries are expected to solve the integration problems of the resettled refugees and bring about appropriately positive attitudes towards the latter on the part of their population. Thus, the High Commissioner has repeatedly complained that immigration and refugee categories are being confused in the admission policy of certain countries and that selection is increasingly being effected on the basis of the refugees' integration potential.

The host countries, in contrast, would like to prevent their humanitarian commitment being cast into doubt by the resettlement of an excessively high number of persons and in particular of refugees with insurmountable integration problems. Moreover, due to their dependency on the votes of the electorate, governments have realized that their influence on the readiness of the population to accept refugees represents a quantity that can only be steered to a limited extent: from the state's point of view, the population's reactions to unsuccessful integration can easily turn into xenophobic attributions of guilt which could jeopardize the whole resettlement program.⁹

These developments have led to fewer persons being resettled than proposed by UNHCR and to UNHCR proposing fewer refugees for resettlement than allowed by the total sum of all national quotas.¹⁰

In order to master the crisis in UNHCR resettlement policy, the competent section has been reorganized. At the same time an effort has been made to lay down the conceptual basis for a clear and consistent future policy. An expression of these efforts is the recently published UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, which is the subject of general praise.

3.2 Current UNHCR policy and selection criteria

In future, more clearly than previously, the new guidelines will attach great importance to resettlement being foreseen only if definitive admission to the country of first asylum or to another country nearby is out of the question, if repatriation is impossible at medium term and if there is immediate urgency. In other words, resettlement is to represent an instrument of protection or is to create the possibility of a durable solution. This is the case

- if there is a danger of refoulement, arbitrary arrest or punishment, or if basic human rights are not guaranteed or physical survival in the country of first asylum is at risk (protection cases);
- if the medical care of a refugee in the country of first asylum cannot be ensured and there is a risk of death, irreversible damage or a need for permanent care, whereas in a third country the chances of a cure and partial or full recovery of autonomy are good;
- for victims of torture;
- for women-at-risk (women with politically persecuted family members, as well as women suffering from specific repression due to their sex or who have been raped);
- for the family members of already resettled refugees, whereby both the members of the nuclear families, further dependent members of the extended family and distant relatives are also taken into consideration;
- for unaccompanied children, if there is little chance of family reunification, efforts having been made to find the parents (or other close relatives) during two years without success, and if the child itself agrees;
- for elderly persons without families, given preferential treatment within the scope of family reunification;
- for longstayers without the prospect of integration in the country of first asylum or return to the country of origin, but with educational or financial capital that would enable them to become integrated in a third country.

The new guidelines on resettlement laid down in the handbook thus correspond largely to the concept of resettlement as the last possible solution. It is to be open to persons whose life is endangered in the country of first asylum (protection cases), or whose life in camps does not correspond to Western humanitarian standards (humanitarian cases, vulnerable groups). This represents a considerable advance in comparison with the automatism of earlier campaigns, as it should no longer lead to the degree of confusion mentioned above between refugees in the more narrow sense and emigrants in a wider sense. A constructive and critical dialogue between the host countries and UNHCR could make a contribution towards the actual implementation of the new policy in future UNHCR practice.

3.3 Alternatives to resettlement in the West

UNHCR resettlement policy has not only come under fire recently with regard to selection criteria, but has also been questioned more fundamentally. The criticism is related to the argument that the enormous sums that have to be raised for the integration of refugees in OECD countries could be used much more effectively for a medium- or long-term solution in the country of first asylum. It could further be argued that - in contrast to the dissolution of refugee camps after the Second World War and also to the resolution of refugee crisis resulting from decolonization - current refugee movements represent a structural problem that cannot be solved by selective and preferential resettlement campaigns.¹¹ The financial resources could therefore be better employed in combating the causes. It was the Scandinavian countries that put this debate on the UNHCR agenda, for which reason this proposal has henceforth been known as the "Nordic Initiative".

The idea of replacing resettlement in a third country by increased aid to countries of first asylum is not, however, new at all. In the UN General Assembly it was already discussed in the early eighties. That initiative was mainly directed at achieving integration in the country of first asylum by means of participation in multilateral development programs. The World Bank subsequently carried out several pioneer projects, (for example, on behalf of Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan) and, following pressure from the USA, the UNHCR launched a Fund for Durable Solutions. The two conferences on refugee problems in Africa organized by the United Nations (ICARA I in 1981 and ICARA II in 1984) were also aimed at finding regional solutions within the framework of development programs. The largest campaign of this kind, however, was carried out in Pakistan on behalf of Afghan refugees. Between 1984 and 1990 a total of approx. 60 million dollars was spent within the scope of the UNHCR-World Bank Program on development projects in the Pakistan border regions.¹²

However, most of these endeavours failed due to the high costs, respectively to the lack of will in particular on the part of the American Congress, which, for example, failed to place the necessary resources at the disposal of the Fund for Durable Solutions.¹³ A more fundamental aspect is that the resettlement of refugees and the implementation of development programs imply strategies with varying time scales, as the unplanned and short-term nature of refugee influxes runs contrary to the character of development processes, which must be orientated towards the long-term and be well planned.¹⁴

Such integration programs - as basically any form of development work - can of course only be successful in a stable political framework and if the administrations in the countries of first

asylum give the project their full support. Whereas several African countries of first asylum had a basically positive attitude to the integration and resettlement of relatively large groups of refugees, experience with Cambodia and Vietnam's neighbour states has shown that frequently other countries only admit refugees for social, foreign policy and economic reasons, provided a guarantee is given by the international community that the refugees will not permanently settle in their countries.

Nevertheless, demands are once more being made for regional solutions in the context of concerted development programs which raise the need for skilled labour. One proposal is the constitution of a working group (consisting of UNHCR, IOM, NGOs plus further multilateral organizations), whose task it would be to develop this idea further.

In the current debate within UNHCR, it seems that conclusions have been drawn from experience with earlier efforts: that besides permanent settlement in the country of first asylum within the framework of development programs, it would also be reasonable to intensify the search for only medium-term solutions in order to avoid resettlement in the North. Thus, the Norwegian delegation, representing the Nordic States, submitted the idea¹⁵ of investing the resources spent on resettlement in the North in the temporary admission to countries of first asylum. However, Norway is convinced that resettlement is still an option in cases with no other solutions in sight and when it is a question of saving life (protection versus durable solution in UNHCR terminology). Thus the Scandinavian countries are not challenging the policy of resettlement absolutely but are interested in its limitation to cases of urgent need for protection.

Already in 1996, to help UNHCR in its search for other solutions, Norway and Denmark placed at its disposal a part of the financial resources that would otherwise have been spent on replenishing their quota places. In 1996, Sweden will only occupy half of the quota places and has started negotiations with UNHCR aimed at determining the use of the resources thus freed. At present the following is being considered:

- Search for alternatives to resettlement in Western host countries: a) in medical cases which could also be treated in a safe country with cheaper medical care; b) for smaller-sized groups with a close linguistic or ethno-cultural relationship to a non-traditional host country.
- Search for new host countries.
- Professionalization of UNHCR resettlement programs, implementation of the procedures and guidelines defined in the handbook.

The "Nordic Initiative" should be seen against the background of the general reorientation of Swedish immigration policy. According to a report of the Parliamentary Commission on Refugee Policy of June 1995¹⁶, the Swedish development, human rights and immigration policies are to be closely co-ordinated. The aim is to reduce migratory pressure in the long term and to limit asylum-orientated immigration to Sweden as far as possible, as the integration problems and resulting costs are on the increase due to economic restructuring. Specifically, resources now spent on welfare and integration work in Sweden are to be used in future for development co-operation and to promote good governance in the countries of first

asylum or of origin in order to render resettlement resp. flight unnecessary. In accordance with this new orientation of immigration and development policies, the "Nordic Initiative" has primarily been developed and closely followed by Sweden. In the meantime, some other Nordic countries have distanced themselves from the initiative.

At present the "Nordic Initiative" seems only to be able to find enforcement in a weakened form and within the framework of bilateral negotiations between Sweden and UNHCR. As clearly shown by the above-listed uses of the Fund, the original idea of basically employing the resources earmarked for the medium-term care of refugees in the country of first asylum rather than for their resettlement in the North is no longer under debate in this form. The call for a fundamentally new conception of the resettlement policy has been modified again and again; today the search is merely for alternatives for specific groups of refugees as well as for new host countries. However, thanks to the initiative, there has been a considerable increase in pressure on UNHCR only to actually consider resettlement in those cases without the prospect of even a medium-term solution.

The initiative was given support at this year's Formal Consultations by IOM, as well as by all the European countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland). In contrast, Australia as well as New Zealand, the USA and Canada, together with certain voluntary relief organizations, were in clear opposition. UNHCR seems to have great difficulty in discussing the initiative really seriously and in finding the way out of its basically defensive position.¹⁷

Conclusion 2

Experience so far has shown that durable integration in a country of first asylum within the framework of multilaterally supported development programs probably represents a realistic option only for a small fraction of the world's refugee population. Because in the context of the diminishing budget for development co-operation there is hardly the will to raise additional funds for the necessary programs. A radical reorientation of existing development co-operation to the flight regions would require a change in political thought such as hardly can be expected in most countries and such as it would probably be very difficult to enforce in Switzerland. This is shown by recent discussions held within the scope of a working group appointed by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs "Foreign Policy in the Sphere of Refugees and the Steering of Migrations". Finally, successful implementation of this concept depends on the political stability as well as on the basic consent of the countries of first asylum, which in some cases would probably only be obtained under considerable international political pressure.

A medium-term admission of refugees to countries of first asylum, on the other hand, would represent a valid alternative to the more costly and, from the point of view of integration, more problematic resettlement in third countries. In this respect there seem to be signs of a consensus among the participants, and UNHCR has come under considerable pressure through the so-called "Nordic Initiative" to only consider resettlements in third countries if there is no possibility of a medium-term admission to the country of first asylum (cf. Chap. 3.1). The "Nordic Initiative", therefore, seems to be a suitable instrument to ensure that this principle is in fact enforced in UNHCR practice. A further-reaching increase in the responsibility of countries of first asylum - with the corresponding support of the

international community - could, however, only be achieved if considerable international pressure was exercised and if UNHCR - against its tradition of non-interference in official policy - orchestrated the appropriate efforts. As shown by the example of Iraqi refugees in Saudi Arabia, however, the use of pressure based on humanitarian and refugee policy motives frequently stands in the way of diverging interests on the part of the great powers, dictated as they are by foreign policy as well as by military and strategic considerations.

In our estimation, the implementation of the "Nordic Initiative" forces reflection on the newly-conceived UNHCR policy in only very few spheres (for example regarding medical cases). However, it can contribute to the search for alternatives to the costly resettlement in the traditional host countries being pursued seriously and to the concept of the "last solution" being applied in UNHCR practice.

4. Immigration window or humanitarian engagement? A comparison of policies of various host countries

The diverging attitudes of certain host countries towards the "Nordic Initiative" becomes understandable if we consider their different selection criteria and integration concepts for quota refugees. There is a basic difference between the quota policy practised by the immigration countries (USA, Canada, Australia) and that of the European welfare states. We can also discern differences within these two rough categories, as the following brief outline of the individual countries clearly shows. Depending on the information available, the descriptions contain more or less detail. First of all, the policy of the traditional immigration countries is outlined, then that of the European states.

In this connection, we would like to stress that in no way do all European states place regular quotas at UNHCR's disposal. Neither Germany nor France, England, Spain, Italy or Austria pursue such a policy. However, some of these countries respond more or less regularly to UNHCR's appeals and also grant admission to relatively large groups of refugees. Others have expressed their willingness to admit an additional minimum number of persons in urgent need of protection each year (Ten-or-more and Twenty-or-more programs). We will then take a quick look at the practice in Germany so that this possibility of co-operation with UNHCR does not get forgotten and we only consider countries with fixed quotas.

4.1 *Qualitative aspects: selection criteria and integration programs*

Australia

It is only since 1993 that a humanitarian program has been separated from the general migration program in Australia. Persons admitted are Convention refugees (after case-by-case decisions) who are given preference from certain regions (at present from Yugoslavia, Iraq, Vietnam), humanitarian cases as well as - the largest quota - family members or groups sponsored by immigrants with residence permits and coming from certain regions (Timor, Yugoslavia, minorities from the former Soviet Union, Burma, Sudan, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Ahmadis from Pakistan). There is no special program for medical cases.

Formerly, two central reception centres were in operation. Today, 300 apartments spread over the whole country are rented to the newcomers at subsidized prices during 13 to 26 weeks. Logistical problems which arose as a result of decentralization have been solved by an NGO (Migrant Resource Centre). This organization provides assistance *in situ*, i.e. it looks at the work and accommodation possibilities for each person or family and ensures that the new arrivals are given access to available services for immigrants (public health, income support, employment agencies, education, language courses, counselling for specific ethnic groups, etc.). Some of these support measures are offered to quota refugees free of charge (language courses, for example, up to 510 lessons) or made more easily accessible (no two-year waiting period until the right to draw welfare assistance).

Most of the persons resettled, however, come to the country within the framework of the so-called Community Refugee Settlement Scheme. The representatives of individual ethnic

groups function as sponsors, guaranteeing successful integration. They are merely reimbursed for initial installation costs and take over the refugees directly on their arrival.

New Zealand

In accordance with the markedly liberal model of society to which New Zealand's government has been committed for some time, all refugees are recruited via the sponsoring principle. Acceptance by a sponsor and his/her willingness to support the refugee, also in the long term, is a prerequisite for admission. Quota refugees spend six weeks in a central reception centre with up to 220 places, where they receive language and orientation courses, are given medical examinations, advice on dealing with the authorities and information about work prospects. An NGO (Refugee and Migrant Service) then co-ordinates settlement all over the country. Whenever possible, the refugees will be living in the immediate proximity of sponsors or relatives (in the case of family reunification). The NGO also recruits and advises the sponsors. In future, the NGOs are to play a greater rôle in the selection of refugees (this is partly effected by selection commissions; most admissions, however, are made on the basis of UNHCR dossiers). At present, the State does not finance any further-reaching English courses or integration assistance.

Canada

Canada may be considered as the country that pays the most attention to actual immigration criteria in the selection of quota refugees. However, the criteria vary according to the type of admission. Refugees receiving government support must on the one hand be Convention refugees and on the other hand show good chances of integration, i.e. *de facto* fulfil the conditions for immigrants. They must be physically and mentally healthy, have sufficient professional qualifications and prospects of becoming economically independent within twelve months. However, refugees may also be sponsored by private persons. These may be, for example, NGOs, groups of at least five Canadian citizens or persons with residence permits and a minimal annual income, or, as in most cases, churches. This group assumes financial responsibility for the refugee during one year.¹⁸ However, these privately sponsored refugees must also fulfil immigration criteria; the decision is made by the Canadian immigration authorities (resp. the visa offices at the embassies) on the basis of interviews, for which reason the sponsor groups carefully pre-evaluate cases submitted to the authorities. A mixed program has been created for medical cases and women-at-risk: the sponsor group is paid for integration assistance by the government, but these refugees should also be economically independent at the latest after two years.

Each admission type foresees the granting of financial support and integration assistance by central government for 12 months, for example in the form of language courses and the possibility of elementary vocational training. Subsequently, refugees can draw the same level of social assistance under the same conditions as Canadians. The compulsory medical examination, travel costs as well as immigration charges, are to be paid by the immigrant personally or by his/her sponsor. The number of sponsored cases has continuously and clearly diminished in recent years.

United States

The USA admission program is characterized by the fact that it still reflects the geopolitical interests of the superpower, its foreign alliances and ideological preferences. Up to 1980, there was no strict legal distinction between refugees and immigrants in the USA; the refugees admitted were almost exclusively from Communist countries or the Middle East.¹⁹ Admission practice has also continued to reflect the USA's geopolitical interests since 1980, when a formal asylum procedure was legally established and an admission level defined for quota refugees.²⁰

The criteria are staggered and comprise: a list of countries per continent given preferential treatment (Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia at first place for Africa, Burma for Asia, the former Soviet Union and Bosnia for Europe, Cuba for Latin America, Iran and Iraq for the Near East); within these groups of countries certain groups of people (cases with an urgent need of protection, women-at-risk, medical cases and victims of torture have top priority; then as second priority come Cubans, Iranians, politically persecuted Laotians as well as Vietnamese who have spent three years in re-education camps, Soviet Jews, Protestants as well as Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians; as a third priority cases of family reunification are listed). A further criterion which, however, does not have to correlate with the others, is refugee status in accordance with American legislation.

Because evidently not only persons with refugee status have a right to be admitted (and *vice versa* not everyone with refugee status has a right to admission to the USA), an immigration window is *de facto* opened via the quota policy for certain groups of persons in whom the USA is interested for geostrategic reasons. These can be seen in an official paper empowering the authorities to "admit any refugee who is not firmly resettled in a third country, who is determined to be of special humanitarian concern, and who is admissible to the United States as an immigrant".²¹ Accordingly, the refugees of working age are expected to have a steady job after one year. Recently, however, the USA has also increasingly considered cases judged as priorities by UNHCR.

Integration care is effected by ten NGOs, with which the government has concluded a long-term agreement, and which are always present at the selection process *in situ*. After an NGO has taken on a refugee as his/her sponsor (for which it is initially reimbursed with a lump sum), the refugee in question is settled directly by the NGO. During a further year, the NGO receives a lump sum of \$1,000 per refugee and month. The NGO is responsible for various kinds of integration assistance being provided during this period (accommodation, clothing, food, medicine, English courses, elementary vocational training, etc.). Some of the programs are directly aimed at giving the refugees economic self-sufficiency, for example by imparting the basic knowledge required for low-qualified jobs. Direct support by the central administration - for example in the form of income assistance or medical care - is limited to one year. The special programs by the Federal States' governments, which are offered parallel to refugees, serve above all to provide the refugees with an income and come to an end after two years. The costs are refunded directly by the Federal Government.²²

Netherlands

The Netherlands is one of the few countries to foresee a fixed quota for medical cases (100 of 480 admissions per year). Selection is carried out by missions. Besides refugee status in accordance with Dutch law and the UN Convention, the valid criteria are also the ability to integrate measured by education, personal initiative, work experience as well as the refugee's prospects of finding an apartment in the Netherlands. For medical cases, the psycho-social health prospects following medical treatment count as an additional criterion.

The integration program is carried out in two phases:²³ in the first phase, the refugees are accommodated in a main reception centre for a period of two to a maximum of three months. There, they receive introductory courses, language training, etc. The aim, however, is to settle the refugees as quickly as possible in the municipalities in order to prevent them becoming dependent on social assistance.

According to the officially declared policy of multiculturalism, the refugees are allocated to the various municipalities in groups and placed in council housing. During a maximum of two years they receive integration assistance (*inter alia* at least 500 language lessons), which the local authorities organize according to their individual needs. Each refugee family is cared for in the municipality, if possible by volunteers, who help to solve daily problems. Diplomas are checked as to their equivalence and "converted". The NGO Netherlands Refugee Foundation advises the municipalities, recruits and monitors volunteers taking part in the integration program.

The central government pays the local authorities a certain sum for each refugee for a maximum of two years; in the case of several refugees being accepted (between 30 and 90), an integration plan is required from the local authorities and the contribution per refugee is considerably increased accordingly. On completion of the integration program, the local authorities receive this financial support from the central government on a decreasing scale for a few more years (a total of approx. 5 years).

Finland and Norway

Medical hardship cases and large groups of women-at-risk are regularly admitted to both these countries. Integration assistance is carried out by the local authorities, whose task it is to create an individual integration plan, to offer language courses and help in school enrolment and to find jobs, etc. In Norway an "integration grant" limited to a period of five years is granted by central government to the local authorities to cover their costs.

Sweden

The Swedish model is similar to that used in the Netherlands, Finland and Norway, insofar as the local authorities are responsible for integration assistance from the beginning. Sweden chooses the refugees by means of regular selection missions (only in rare cases do they decide on the basis of UNHCR dossiers). The new arrivals are first sent to reception centres, but are settled in the municipalities as soon as they are granted a permanent residence permit. The

Immigration Ministry concludes a basic agreement with the local authorities, obliging them to take care for a certain number of refugees (with a basic contribution for the conclusion of the agreement). The municipal integration programs (incl. accommodation, language courses, translation services, etc.) are then financed by central government for a period of one to three years, provided the refugee is still living in the municipality. After one year, according to the circumstances, a permanent residence permit is granted and refugee status is determined. Refugees receive social assistance as Swedish citizens do, but must fulfil certain conditions in order to claim the full contributions (e.g. attend regular language courses).

Denmark

The Danish model is characterized by a particularly intensive and long-lasting initial integration phase.²⁴ An NGO is responsible for organizing the integration program, in contrast to the other Scandinavian countries. Quota refugees take part in the program during 18 months like recognized refugees following asylum proceedings; this is carried out by the Danish Refugee Council (an umbrella organization comprising several relief organizations). During this time refugees are accommodated in various centres run by the DRC. Subsequently, they are placed in the municipalities and from then on have the same access as the rest of the population to the various social services.

Germany

In contrast to the countries discussed so far, the Federal Republic of Germany does not place annual quotas for the admission of refugees at UNHCR's disposal. It works together with UNHCR on a case-by-case basis in order to provide admission places within the framework of an international resettlement campaign. In this way, the Federal Republic of Germany has admitted a total of 35,000 refugees from Indochina,²⁵ 1,500 Chileans as well as 15,000 Bosnians. The decision must be supported without reservation by the Federal States and admission only effected within the framework of an international campaign from which the Federal Republic cannot withdraw on political and moral grounds. The immigration of Russian Jews (approx. 40,000 up to the end of 1995) was carried out within the scope of the same law which also governs the admission of quota refugees.

4.2 Quantitative aspects: quota places and actual admissions


As shown by the previous description, the admission of quota refugees to the traditional immigration countries is considered to be a more or less integral part of immigration policy. It is therefore not surprising the lion's share of all quota refugees are resettled in these countries. In contrast, the absolute number of persons finding refuge in Europe is very low.

However, differences in size must be taken into account. If we relate the quotas to the size of the respective population, we obtain the following ranking order for 1996.²⁶ Australia provides 85 quota places per 100,000 inhabitants, the USA 35, Canada 27, New Zealand 24, Norway 23, Sweden 11, Denmark 10, Finland 10, Switzerland 6 and the Netherlands 3. Thus, even in

relation to the size of their populations, the immigration countries offer UNHCR significantly more places than their European counterparts.

However, we obtain a slightly modified picture if we ignore the size of the quotas in favour of the admissions actually effected. The following diagram gives an overview of the development in the various host countries. It shows in particular that the major immigration countries, such as the USA, Canada and Australia, admit significantly fewer refugees today in relation to the size of their populations than Sweden, New Zealand or even Denmark. The diagram also illustrates the clear trend that, since the end of the Vietnam program, interest in quota policy, particularly on the part of the immigration countries, has continuously diminished.

Figure I:
Number of quota refugees in proportion to population size of host countries,
1990 to 1995



Sources: for the number of quota refugees resettled: UNHCR, Resettlement Statistics, various years; for the size of populations: US Bureau of Census.

Remark: Refugees from Bosnia admitted outside the quota are included in the figures for Switzerland in 1993.

The diagram also gives us the opportunity to take a first look at Switzerland's relative willingness to admit refugees. Among all the countries regularly providing UNHCR with quota places, Switzerland, together with the Netherlands, has belonged to the least committed countries since the nineties - from a purely quantitative viewpoint, this is not a very good reference for the humanitarian tradition of this country.


1993, however, was an exceptional year as 1,700 persons were granted refugee status within the framework of the Bosnian campaign. Measured against the total population, Switzerland admitted the most refugees in that year. The example clearly shows that Switzerland responds generously to appeals for help in particularly dramatic cases of refugee plight.

This can be illustrated by a few examples. With regard to the admission of Indochina refugees - the largest resettlement program ever carried out by UNHCR - there is the following ranking order, weighted according to population size: up to 1988, Australia admitted 70 refugees per 10,000 inhabitants, Canada 46, the USA 28, New Zealand 25, France 19, Hong Kong 17, Norway 14 and Switzerland 12.²⁷ The other European and certain Asian countries follow at a clear distance. Thus, Switzerland comes second behind Norway out of all the countries that are neither immigration countries nor had a particularly colonial-historical (France) or ethnic (Hong Kong) relationship to Indochina.

A similar picture could be drawn with reference to the admission of refugees from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Tibet and Hungary. Switzerland also admitted a relatively large number of Chilean refugees, the only large internationally co-ordinated campaign aimed at resettling refugees from non-Communist countries during the Cold War. And this although, in contrast to Sweden, for example, there was no special political affinity between the government party and the refugees, although no strong Communist party like those of Italy and France and no special cultural links existed as to Spain. In this case, however, it took considerable public pressure to bring the Swiss authorities round to a more generous admission practice.²⁸ Finally, Switzerland admitted the most Chilean refugees in relation to population size, following Sweden and Spain, thus almost as many as Canada and Australia.²⁹

A further characteristic of Swiss policy is that a comparatively large number of medical cases is admitted. The following diagram shows this very clearly. Switzerland admitted the most medical cases in relation to the total number of those admitted via the resettlement program.³⁰


Figure II:
Proportion of medical cases to the total number of
refugees resettled between 1990 and 1995



Source: UNHCR

However, we still have to take account of the comparatively low total numbers of admissions to Switzerland. If we consider the admission of medical cases in relation to the total resident population, Switzerland still belongs to the countries with a generous admission practice. However, from this perspective New Zealand and certain Scandinavian countries admit significantly more cases (Figure III).

Figure III:
Number of medical cases resettled between 1990 and 1995
per mille total population



Source: UNHCR

Conclusion 3

The quota policy practised by immigration countries and European welfare states basically differs in two ways: firstly, the immigration countries have a long tradition of recruiting qualified refugees in order to cover the needs of their labour market. The European countries, in contrast, do not pursue such a specific policy of recruitment, but make a stricter division between the humanitarian sphere of granting asylum and the immigration of unqualified labour.

Secondly, the European welfare states start from the assumption that refugees have the same guarantee to automatic public social assistance as nationals, should they not find an adequate income on the labour market. In the immigration countries with an Anglo-Saxon tradition, public assistance is only granted to refugees who provide proof of their individual need. Corresponding to this view of the welfare state, and according to the liberal Anglo-Saxon social ideology, the immigration countries place a greater value on the responsibility of those persons who commit themselves to the admission of a specific group of refugees (sponsoring system, recourse to already established groups of immigrants). Moreover, they frequently select a major part of the refugees on the basis of their integration prospects. There is mostly also a comprehensive support and assistance system serving the integration of all categories of immigrants, which is also open to refugees. In the European host countries, on the other hand, humanitarian principles prevail in the process of selection, and the responsibility for successful integration is mostly carried by the municipalities.

The differences are also evident in the quantitative sphere. The immigration countries admit the greatest share of all refugees who are foreseen for resettlement in a third country within the framework of an UNHCR program. However, a differentiated approach, which takes the varying demographic conditions into account, comes to the conclusion that in recent years certain European, in particular Scandinavian countries, have admitted far more refugees in relation to their population size than the immigration countries Canada, the USA and Australia.

In Switzerland, on the other hand, significantly fewer refugees were admitted within the framework of UNHCR quotas than most of the other countries which co-operate with UNHCR in this manner. But, within the quotas, Switzerland admits the greatest proportion of medical cases. The picture changes once more if we also take into account the special campaigns which are carried out as a response to particularly dramatic refugee crisis. In the admission of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, from Indochina, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Tibet and Hungary, but also from Chile, despite the lack of cultural or political affinities and historical connections, Switzerland showed an above-average willingness to admit. This commitment can be seen as an expression of the humanitarian tradition of Swiss foreign policy.

B Swiss policy

5 The humanitarian tradition within the context of Swiss foreign policy

What is the origin of this humanitarian tradition and within which ideological, political and international context did it develop? What rôle does it play in the judgement of Swiss quota policy and in its future form? Although official Switzerland likes to refer to this tradition, there is as yet no comprehensive historical study or political analysis. In the following chapter we will try to make such an analysis at least in the form of a provisional outline; for without even a superficial understanding of the significance of this tradition, Swiss policy on the admission of quota refugees cannot be understood.

In contrast to neutrality, the "humanitarian tradition" is not a concept defined under international law. And humanity - in contrast to neutrality, universality, disponibility and solidarity - did not belong to the official pillars of Switzerland's post-war foreign policy, on which foreign minister Petitpierre left his mark.³¹ The "humanitarian tradition", however, stands in a very close relationship to these principles. Besides participation in international organizations and conferences ("co-operative solidarity"), it represents one of the two aspects of the principle of solidarity.³² Of particular interest is the relationship to neutrality, the keystone of Swiss foreign policy since 1815. In Switzerland's awareness of her own political identity, neutrality and humanity are brought into a close contextual relationship:³³ lasting neutrality is considered an ideal condition for the assumption of humanitarian tasks, and this from several points of view.

Firstly, the protective powers of the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of War Victims must have a neutral status under international law. However, Switzerland has always rejected a possible obligation under international law deriving therefrom that foresees the assumption of protective mandates or a special humanitarian commitment. Switzerland's engagement is perceived as being of a voluntary nature, in the service of her sovereign foreign policy. Secondly, neutrality is a prerequisite of humanitarian action in case of war, guaranteeing impartial humanity towards refugees and war victims. Thirdly, in the event of an armed conflict between neighbouring states, a country's neutrality provides a guarantee that an island of humanity is preserved in the midst of war. And fourthly, the principle of a neutral country's humanity allows it to legitimize its political and military abstinence in the event of war. Any reproaches addressed to the small neutral state by the victors of a "just war" can be rebuffed by stressing that neutral status facilitates the fulfilment of humanitarian tasks in times of war and peace, and might even be a condition for this. It is this fourth aspect which is of most interest in our study and which we will therefore look at in more detail below.

At the latest since the Franco-German War of 1870 and the internment of the Bourbaki Army, the supplementation and legitimization of neutrality through humanitarian/charitable activities have belonged to the repertoire of Swiss foreign policy. This practice has since then been repeatedly endorsed and intensified. It achieved a special significance following the Second World War, when the status of neutrality had probably reached the lowest point of its international prestige and Switzerland's non-participation in the struggle against Hitler's regime was perceived as a kind of secretive collusion,³⁴ particularly on the part of the

Americans and the Soviet Russians. In his efforts to lead Switzerland out of her international isolation, Petitpierre explicitly endorsed the special affinity between humanity and neutrality: "La neutralité peut être considérée comme un privilège lorsqu'elle permet d'échapper à des guerres comme celles de ce siècle. Il est naturel que ce privilège ait comme contrepartie des devoirs, - non pas des obligations imposées, mais des devoirs acceptés volontairement -, d'abord sur le plan humanitaire, mais aussi, lorsque l'acceptation d'une tâche à remplir est dans l'intérêt de la paix, pour faciliter le règlement pacifique de problèmes qui sont un élément de trouble ou une cause d'hostilité entre autres pays."³⁵

Thus, just as the much appreciated good offices during the Cold War, Switzerland's humanitarian tradition is officially justified with reference to the moral deficits of her lasting neutrality and has stood in the service of her international reintegration and rehabilitation since the Second World War.

Already before the end of the war, Switzerland attempted to put this special constellation - neutrality and humanity - into concrete form by a show of solidarity towards the war-damaged neighbouring countries. Within the framework of an official donation and aid campaign (the "Swiss Gift"), she mobilized some 200 million Francs for reconstruction and refugee aid. This corresponded roughly to the contribution required by UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency), amounting to 2% of the GDP. Again due to neutrality considerations, Switzerland had not joined UNRRA, which represented *de facto* an organization of the Allies.³⁶

The Swiss policy of a voluntary testimony to humanity outside existing multilateral organizations continued to be practised after the war. The location in Geneva of important UN organizations of a humanitarian or technical nature, which was already an established tradition, further intensified the link between neutrality and humanity-solidarity in Swiss foreign policy. UN membership would eventually also have been welcomed by the victorious powers and was also hoped for by the Swiss. However, this option was not pursued further because Switzerland considered a discussion of her neutrality reservations as mandatory, which was held to be inopportune within the still fragile UN. In its place, Switzerland tried to play an active rôle wherever possible within the scope of UN specialized "technical" or "humanitarian" agencies.³⁷

It was also in this context that relations between Switzerland and the international refugee organizations developed: after the war, Switzerland joined both the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe and also its successor (ICM, Intergovernmental Committee for Migration), and was one of the 18 Member States of IRO (International Refugee Organization), the forerunner of UNHCR.³⁸ As the depository state of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and European seat of the UN, Switzerland seemed to be the ideal location for UNHCR headquarters. From the start, Switzerland participated in the refugee programs developed by UNHCR - in regard to refugee policy there was also an urgent need to help Switzerland's humanitarian tradition to find new credibility after the Second World War³⁹ and in this way to support the policy of neutrality and non-participation in the developing new international order.

Since that time, Switzerland has been one of UNHCR's important donor countries and in 1995, with 25 million Francs, was still the ninth most important contributor, in spite of a

substantial reduction in the nominal contributions since 1993. Since 1959, the foundation of UNHCR, three of the eight High Commissioners so far have been of Swiss nationality (Lindt, Schnyder, Hocké). The neutrality of persons with Swiss nationality may have played a rôle in the elections, especially as this could have been of use for the leadership of the most important humanitarian organization within the UN system, in particular during the confrontation between the two blocs.

Since the end of the Cold War and in view of the acceleration and intensification of the European process of unification, the basic Swiss conception of foreign policy has changed and adapted to new geopolitical realities. According to the concept of Swiss foreign policy in the nineties, approved by the Federal Council in 1993⁴⁰, the legitimate national interests of Switzerland were now to be upheld by a new interpretation of the status of neutrality, comprising extensive participation in non-military forms of international co-operation. This new concept is based on the insight that the most important problems posed today at international level, both in the sphere of politics and security (development problems in the South, sustainable growth, etc.) can only be overcome by global co-operation and that it is no longer in Switzerland's interest to stand aside.

The main objectives of Swiss foreign policy are the safeguarding of peace, the support of a stable environment in the sphere of security, the defence of human rights and the rule of law as well as efforts on behalf of the sustainable growth of the world economy, a levelling of the gap between North and South as well as the preservation of the natural environment. Switzerland's humanitarian tradition is reflected in the defence of human rights and constitutional guarantees, which however also serves the understandable self-interest of a minor state to live in a stable political environment.

Besides the long-term objective of joining the EU and the UN, the strengthening of relations with international organizations also represents one of the principle strategies of increased international participation. As both EU and UN membership still lie far in the future and full EU membership would have delicate implications for Switzerland's neutrality, the fact that she stands aside from the most important multilateral organizations means that Switzerland needs - more than ever - a legitimizing safeguard. The old formula of neutrality and humanity/solidarity seems to hold good for the time being.

The latest developments in the sphere of flight prevention have given an additional significance to this relationship. At the end of the Gulf War, the concept of safe havens for refugees protected by the military was realized for the first time in favour of the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Since then, several attempts to apply this concept have taken place; in the case of Bosnia, however, with at best mixed results. In this connection, within NATO and other alliance systems a kind of division of labour was established between countries taking a military part in the campaign and those countries contributing to the solution of the crisis by assuming humanitarian tasks or by admitting large numbers of refugees, because for various reasons (neutrality, Germany's constitutional reservations), they did not send any troops. It is also against this background that we should interpret the extremely uneven distribution of Bosnian refugees among the European host countries. Should this division of labour also establish itself in other cases, Switzerland's foreign policy would come under increasing pressure to prop up her neutrality by humanitarian actions. This may, however, be effected through the admission of refugees as well as by means of humanitarian aid *in situ*, a sphere in

which Switzerland has been particularly engaged, as is generally acknowledged, in the former Yugoslavia.⁴¹

Conclusion 4

Both contextually and from a historical viewpoint, Switzerland's humanitarian tradition is closely related to her neutrality. Viewed from the outside, the humanitarian aspects of Swiss foreign policy may be interpreted as a safeguard legitimizing Switzerland's non-participation ensuing from her policy of neutrality. After the Second World War, the humanitarian tradition stood in the service of reintegrating Switzerland in the world order, acquiring increased significance during the Cold War. Although since the détente and in view of the Federal Council policy of opening up, attempts to join the world's most important multilateral organizations need no longer fail because of reservations related to neutrality, the position on the sideline chosen by Switzerland will characterize the reality of our foreign policy for some time to come. Moreover, within the framework of the new world order with the dominant theme of multilateral co-operation, it seems that countries which cannot or do not want to take part in joint military actions are expected to engage themselves especially in the sphere of humanitarian campaigns.

Switzerland's humanitarian tradition will therefore maintain its importance in the global concept of relations to the international community and the intensification of relations with UN specialized agencies will remain an element of future integration strategy. The project to make Geneva the centre of humanitarian organizations ("Genève humanitaire") makes it clear that the will to continue the humanitarian tradition remains intact. If we accept that the humanitarian tradition has assumed and still assumes a lasting importance in Switzerland, we may conclude that a reduction or even an abandonment of the quotas placed at the disposal of UNHCR and a correspondingly deteriorating relationship with the principle UN organization in the humanitarian sphere would imply certain political costs. This could, however, be avoided if the admission of quota refugees was replaced by another humanitarian commitment that would be clearly visible to the outside world.

6 The development of Swiss quota policy

After this long digression on the international significance of the Swiss humanitarian policy, we will now return to the more narrow subject. As already mentioned (Chap. 4.2), this tradition is particularly reflected in the fact that, in special cases of refugee plight, Switzerland has responded generously to appeals for help launched by international organizations.

6.1 The admission of quota refugees, 1950 to 1989

Art. 22 of the current Asylum Act (Art. 53 of the new Asylum Act) provides the legal basis for the admission of refugee groups without individual asylum proceedings. The Federal Department of Justice and Police is responsible for granting the necessary permits in the case of small groups (present practice: up to 100), the full Federal Council for larger groups. The following groups of refugees have so far been admitted to Switzerland on the basis of such Federal Council decisions: Hungarians following the 1956 uprising, Tibetans in 1963, Ugandans of Indian origin after their expulsion by Amin's government, Chileans following the fall of Allende, a large number of Czechs following the crushing of the Prague Spring Uprising, Vietnamese and other Indochinese refugees after the fall of Saigon, Poles after the coup at the beginning of the eighties and finally a large group of war victims from the former Yugoslavia.

In accordance with Switzerland's humanitarian tradition, she also admitted a large number of persons who, because they did not fulfil immigration criteria, had no chance of emigration to the classical immigration countries. This policy was already established after the Second World War, with Switzerland admitting those refugees who could not be considered for resettlement overseas and who had been left in the Italian and Austrian camps.

Up to 1988, by means of Federal Council decisions that were renewed every three years, Switzerland provided special quotas for elderly or disabled refugees. Between 1951 and 1980, approx. 3,000 disabled refugees came to Switzerland within the framework of these special programs; according to another source they made up approx. 20 per cent of all persons admitted.⁴² Most of them were elderly, although not necessarily serious cases in need of care according to Switzerland's selection criteria. They were mostly accommodated in old people's homes that were run by voluntary relief agencies.⁴³

The diagram on the previous page gives an overview of Swiss quota policy since the Second World War. It shows, on the one hand, the admission of large groups of refugees within the framework of internationally co-ordinated resettlement programs and, on the other hand, the quotas continuously offered for disabled refugees and individual humanitarian cases.

In retrospect, the integration process of the refugees admitted developed apparently without any great difficulty until the end of the seventies. However, up to now there has not been a serious scientific assessment of integration experience. It seems that the origin, age structure and composition of groups, in particular of East European origin, has positively affected the process of integration.

The situation changed with the arrival of the Indochina refugees in the early eighties, and the above-mentioned crisis in the policy of internationally co-ordinated resettlement (cf. Chap. 3.1) was also reflected in Swiss discussions. This gradually led to a new conception of Swiss admission criteria. By degrees, Switzerland moved away from the principle of admitting precisely those cases that did not find admission elsewhere, and there was a gradual approach to the policy of the other European states - even if Switzerland's humanitarian tradition continued to manifest itself in the admission of a large number of medical cases (cf. Chap. 4.2). We will now describe this development in more detail.

In the course of the Indochina campaign, the NGOs caring for refugees began to doubt whether implantation in a Western industrialized country was really meaningful and if integration work within the scope of existing assistance programs could achieve successful results. In particular many of the elderly and young persons that had been resettled showed signs of mental and social strain. In contrast, the chances of integration for the physically disabled who could really be helped in Switzerland were assessed positively, as the incentive offered by recovery improved chances of integration and because of the excellent care structures for the disabled in Switzerland. However, the integration of the socially underprivileged was particularly difficult. These persons were characterized by the mentality of dependency on social assistance acquired in the camps, and many had to be considered as social problem cases. Social and psychological problems cumulated in the case of unaccompanied young people, who sometimes gravitated into illegality and marginality.

Therefore, when making a preliminary selection of the dossiers submitted by UNHCR, the NGOs began to give priority to the refugees' mental and social ability to integrate, and no longer proposed for admission any more unaccompanied young persons or refugees with mental or severe social problems. Vietnamese refugees were mostly accommodated directly in apartments, if possible near families of the same origin. However, as in the other host countries, with the exception of the Netherlands, the basic conception consisted of effecting a dispersed settlement and not allowing the formation of «ghettos».⁴⁴

UNHCR dossiers also gave rise to major problems - problems that we have mentioned and which we are now going to look at from the Swiss point of view: under the label of "hardcore cases" (cases in need of constant and considerable care), disabled persons with good chances of integration also entered Switzerland, in the category of disabled there were persons in good health without reasons for asylum, under the category of healthy persons also mentally sick persons, under the label unaccompanied young persons came persons with intact families in the country of origin, etc. UNHCR seemed to be primarily interested in a rapid "turnover" of

all the difficult groups of persons not admitted by the immigration countries, irrespective of the criteria applied by the other host countries. In spite of these difficulties and despite the known integration problems, the NGOs urged the Federal Government to resume special programs which had been suspended after the Indochina campaign. Economic considerations might also have played a certain rôle - as representatives of the NGOs themselves admitted.⁴⁵ In 1984, following a three-year pause for reflection, the Federal Council resumed the special programs for disabled refugees.

The process of reconsidering Swiss admission policy, however, went on. In 1987, following an assessment of their experiences so far, the NGOs gave precise details of their ideas on how the integration perspectives of quota refugees could be improved. This was to be achieved by: a) improved selection criteria (no single minors or elderly persons without connections to Switzerland, no mentally but only physically disabled persons, the admission of small groups of related-acquainted persons led by a dominant personality constituting an integration factor, the presence of relatives in Switzerland, b) the formation of reception centres, c) the provision of ethno-specific assistance and counselling services, d) the active participation of refugees already resident in the integration and care of new arrivals, and d) a corresponding revision of the dispersion principle in the settlement of refugees as well as the suspension of residence permits tied to the Canton.

They also called for more flexible programs, i.e. programs adapted to existing integration facilities, and for return to be more consistently considered as an option, for the extension of help *in situ* (e.g. for disabled refugees) and for appropriate projects to be set up with local partners.⁴⁶ Most of these proposals, in particular regarding Switzerland's selection criteria as well as the establishment of reception centres, were finally adopted in the newly formulated policy following negotiations and discussions between NGOs and the Delegate for Refugee Affairs.⁴⁷

6.2 *New conception at the end of the eighties*

The new policy, conceived in 1989, is still valid today in principle. It differs from former policy in four points: firstly, in comparison with former practice, it is a more systematic and professional concept. This development was due to the experiences of the NGOs during the Indochina campaign, and above all in the good understanding between the Delegate for Refugee Affairs and the NGOs. A further factor was the economic boom, which rendered all financial considerations almost irrelevant, thus making it possible for the NGOs to extend their assistance programs and the necessary capacities.

Secondly, in accordance with the new global constellation of conflicts (cf. Chap. 2), its objective was to admit several small groups of refugees from different regional conflicts. Consequently, Switzerland now for the first time offered small annual quotas for non-disabled refugees (cf. Figure IV). According to the Federal Council decision of 14th August 1991, 500 refugees were to be admitted per calendar year from 1991 to 1994.

Thirdly, the integration assistance programs were designed more systematically. From 1989 onwards, three permanent reception centres were established for the admission of newly-arriving quota refugees: one in Neuenegg, one in Morlon and later one in Gersau, which can

also be used for the reception of disabled refugees. Hitherto, reception centres of this type had only been erected for the length of the admission campaign in the case of large groups (for example of Chileans⁴⁸ or Vietnamese). Now they were to be firmly established and stand at the disposal of quotas authorized by Federal Council decision in the years from 1991 to 1994. This new Swiss policy regarding quota refugees was confirmed in the Federal Council report on aliens and refugee policy of 1991.⁴⁹

Fourthly, the basic principles of the resettlement policy were modified parallel to those of UNHCR. Switzerland only supports resettlement campaigns provided they correspond to the principle of the "last possible solution", i.e. provided regional resettlement or voluntary return are impossible. Thus, in this respect, Switzerland is in harmony with the new UNHCR concept. All persons to be admitted must be recognized as refugees according to UNHCR status. Switzerland participates in various UNHCR programs:⁵⁰

- Special programs for elderly, sick and disabled refugees (humanitarian cases, vulnerable groups).
- Admission of refugees on humanitarian grounds. In this category there are both family reunifications which cannot be processed according to Art. 7 of the Asylum Act as well as long-term refugees (longstayers) or persons with economic or family connections to Switzerland, and finally those whose personal safety is at risk in the country of first asylum (protection cases).
- Special campaigns for the admission of whole groups of refugees (for example from Iran or Iraq).
- Urgent applications for admission filed by NGOs or Swiss representations abroad, mostly for relatively small groups, when speed is at a priority.

Fifthly, Switzerland's admission criteria were more clearly formulated and integration chances given more weight than before. Today, Switzerland's admission criteria more or less correspond to those of the other European countries. However, as has been shown, Switzerland still considers a significantly greater number of medical cases than the other host countries (see Chap. 4.2).

The details of selection criteria applied in Switzerland were discussed between the FOR and OSAR and laid down in the guidelines of 7th August 1989 and of 26th June 1992.⁵¹ Switzerland gives priority to:

- persons whose professional integration will not cause too many difficulties,
- complete families with children,
- single women with children, in emergency situations (women-at-risk),
- members of ethnic minorities,
- persons who already have close family ties to Switzerland (e.g. to recognized refugees), but no such ties to other countries,
- persons over 16 (unless there is an unlimited guarantee for maintenance in Switzerland),
- hardship cases,
- physically disabled persons, provided there is a good chance of a cure or reintegration in Switzerland,
- no elderly or sick persons without family ties to Switzerland.

The selection procedure is effected in several stages.⁵² UNHCR submits a proposal for the admission of certain groups of refugees. The procedure varies according to whether it is a question of individual humanitarian cases (vulnerable groups) or the admission of groups (protection cases, special programs). In the first case, UNHCR submits the cases simultaneously to OSAR and the FOR. OSAR refers the dossiers to the NGOs, which carry out a first assessment. Thereupon the FOR decides on the admission of the persons proposed by the NGOs. The entry permit is issued following a definitive acceptance on the part of the NGOs.

In large groups of persons in need of protection, or within the framework of special campaigns, the Federal Office for Refugees decides on the basis of corresponding requests from UNHCR. The cases submitted by UNHCR are discussed within the framework of a co-ordination group consisting of FOR and NGO representatives (KKF Koordinationsgruppe für Kontingentsflüchtlinge), which formulates a proposal for the admissions of the current year. This proposal is then examined by an internal FOR working group (GROCO, Groupe de co-ordination en matière de réfugiés sous contingent) and a decision is made. In cases of over 50 refugees, the decision on admission is made by the Head of Department, in groups of over 100, by the Federal Council.

UNHCR is informed of the decision. It then sends the relevant individual dossiers both to OSAR and to the FOR, whereby Swiss admission criteria are to be observed. OSAR and the FOR subsequently meet within the framework of the KKF in order to compare the results of their selection. UNHCR is informed of the decision by the FOR and at the same time the Swiss embassies issue the necessary visas, whereupon IOM is asked by UNHCR to organize transportation.⁵³ In the case of large operations (as in Malaysia in 1989, in Thailand in 1990, in the Philippines in 1992), selection missions are sent to the countries of first asylum. These missions are composed of representatives of the FOR and the NGOs.


Immigration costs are defrayed by the Federal Government (Art. 51 Asylum Order 2). Provided they enter Switzerland in groups of ten or more persons, the refugees are taken directly from Kloten to the three reception centres. They spend about six months there before being allocated by the NGOs to the Cantons. This allocation is determined after discussion with the Cantonal authorities. Only then is the decision on asylum formally made by the FOR - in principle, however, the question of refugee status is not under debate. Since 1993, individual cases of handicapped refugees have been admitted to a centre with the appropriate infrastructure (Gersau); before this date they were placed directly in the care of the regional offices of the NGOs.

6.3 Recent developments within the context of the global situation in the sphere of asylum policy

The recent reorientation of the policy relative to quota refugees seems to stand in connection with three developments: firstly, the rapidly growing numbers of asylum seekers since the end of the eighties; secondly, with the end of the economic boom at the beginning of the nineties as well as the efforts to save money deployed by the authorities; thirdly with the events in Bosnia. The three developments will be dealt with below.


The diagram on the next page is intended to remind the reader of an already well-known fact: that ten years ago, a small wave of immigrants began to flow outside the traditional paths of labour migration. This influx of asylum seekers initially led to a complete overstraining of the competent authorities. With the creation of the necessary capacities and the more restrictive formulation of laws, the problems then shifted to the sphere of execution.

Figure V:
Increase in asylum migration, 1975 to 1995



To what extent has Switzerland been affected more than other countries by all these developments? A comparison with the other European states show that, in proportion to the size of the population, an especially high number of asylum applications were filed in Switzerland (Figure VI) except between 1992 and 1994 when other countries took over the lead.


Figure VI:
Development of asylum applications in proportion to size of population, 1986 to 1996



Source: Eurostat / IGC

The number of asylum applications filed annually is not particularly significant as, especially since the crisis in Yugoslavia, other forms of residence permits (provisional admission, etc.) have gained in importance. The following illustration gives an impression of the total number of refugees entering the country, irrespective of their later residence status (Figure VII). It shows that Switzerland and Sweden once again belong to the countries which, in proportion to their population, admitted a significantly high number of refugees.

Figure VII:
Number of refugees* admitted annually per million inhabitants,
1988 to 1994



* Included are asylum seekers, provisionally admitted persons, recognized refugees, quota refugees, family reunifications and humanitarian residence permits.

The calculations are based on the lists of Michael Jandl. 1995. Structure and Costs of the Asylum Systems in Seven European Countries. Vienna: ICMPD. Manuscript. Pp. IV f.

In order to estimate the total burden on a state, it is wise to take into account not only the annual growth but also the total cumulated number of all persons in the asylum system, i.e. inclusive refugees, provisionally admitted persons, those with pending asylum applications, tolerated but rejected asylum seekers, etc. On the basis of the best current available collection of data,⁵⁴ we can estimate that in 1994 and in relation to the size of the population, Switzerland was accommodating a comparatively large number of refugees on her territory

(approx. 1.6 per cent of the total resident population). Other European countries recorded significantly lower proportions (Italy, France, Great Britain), but also higher proportions (Germany and Sweden approx. 2%).

On the whole, then, Switzerland was as affected by the wave of asylum migration and the consequences of the crisis in Yugoslavia as the other European countries with established asylum proceedings and with a tradition as an asylum country. With Sweden, she belongs to the European countries which feel worldwide refugee problems most directly. In proportion to the size of the population, these countries have overproportionally participated in burden-sharing.

In the recent reconsideration of Swiss quota policy, however, the way in which the state organs perceive asylum problems from a national perspective is more important than a comparative view of the relative burden, as we have so far presented. This perception is characterized *inter alia* by financial criteria. Parallel to the growing number of asylum applications and to the increase in execution difficulties, the FOR budget rose from 150 million Francs in 1986 to approx. 810 million Francs in 1995, whereby roughly 85% of expenditure consisted of welfare assistance for asylum seekers, refugees and provisionally admitted persons. In view of the ever-rising Federal deficit, serious efforts to save money were finally implemented, and the FOR was also exposed to a growing pressure to reduce costs or at least to stabilize them. As the quotas represented one of the few directly steerable elements in the sphere of asylum whose reduction would immediately be reflected in lower costs, the pressure on the FOR budget probably directly contributed to a reconsideration of the quota policy.

The third development to be discussed here is the war in Bosnia. It carried into the heart of Europe wars of an ethno-nationalistic type, supposedly reserved to the South, and which characterized the structure of conflicts following the end of the bloc confrontation. For this reason, the war in Bosnia upset the policy formulated by UNHCR and most European host countries following experiences in Vietnam. This had consisted of no longer undertaking any massive resettlements by groups, but in the first place to foresee for resettlement carefully selected humanitarian cases, individually chosen, as well as small groups of persons in need of protection. In a certain sense, the Bosnian crisis means a return to the largely politically motivated group admission of refugees without examination of their individual needs. Certainly, in contrast to Vietnam, there is a determination to send back most of the Bosnian refugees. However, this seems to be increasingly difficult to execute in view of the political developments in Bosnia, so that we must reckon with the *de facto* settlement of a large number of refugees. This has weakened the interest on the part of the host countries in the proposals submitted by UNHCR regarding the resettlement of non-European refugees.

At the end of 1992, within the framework of his Bosnian campaign, the Federal Council decided to grant asylum to former camp inmates and persons displaced by war without counting their admissions as part of UNHCR quotas. Within "Campaign 200", 200 refugees, and in "Campaign 1,000/5,000", 1,000 persons were admitted; these persons had a right to apply for family reunification. The admission and care of these large groups were effected via existing centres for asylum seekers which had been rapidly transformed by the Cantons and the NGOs into reception centres for refugees. In this way, the authorities saw that the admission of refugees was also feasible without reception centres for quota refugees.⁵⁵

Against the background of these three developments and in the face of constantly increasing domestic and financial pressure, the FOR modified its quota policy in practice, although without first discussing the matter thoroughly and presenting the outlines of a new policy. This resulted in a certain amount of consternation and insecurity on the part of the Swiss NGOs and UNHCR. First of all, various proposals from the NGOs/UNHCR regarding the admission of Iraqi prisoners of war and Ethiopians were rejected and only the admission of individual humanitarian cases authorized. In 1993, the FOR stated that, in future, only individual humanitarian cases were to be admitted, and that groups from Asia, the Near East or Africa would no longer be admitted, as in the future selected aid campaigns that were limited in time (as for Yugoslavia) were also planned in Europe - which would have meant *de facto* abandonment of the quota policy that was newly formulated in 1989.⁵⁶

However, because the NGOs also submitted for 1994 a proposal for the admission of Somali, Iraqi, Iranian as well as Ethiopian refugees, a compromise was reached for that year, whereby 200 Somali refugees from Kenya were admitted. However, only 50 of them received a definitive permit.⁵⁷ Of the foreseen annual admission of 500 refugees, only half were actually carried out up to 1994, so that the Federal Council extended the quotas until the end of 1996. The UNHCR proposals were more and more frequently rejected, *inter alia* also because persons were proposed for admission from countries of origin which Switzerland had classified as safe from persecution and to which expulsions were already foreseen.⁵⁸ Until 1996, the admission of quota refugees almost came to a standstill: in spring 1996, the Head of Department rejected an application for the admission of 300 Iraqis from Saudi Arabia that had been prepared jointly by the NGOs and the FOR, after the Conference of Cantonal Welfare Directors had expressed financial doubts.⁵⁹

This fluctuating policy made medium-term planning almost impossible, which sometimes led to considerable delays in admission and to less than full utilization of the reception centres during months. Accordingly motivation problems on the part of staff at the centres appeared. Long-term planning of ethno-specific assistance programs and the recruitment of the corresponding personnel became almost impossible.

As a result, relations between OSAR and the FOR seem to be rather strained today - in contrast to the time when the new policy was formulated. The manner in which conflicts are dealt with must be considered within the context of the general structure of relations between the Federal Office and the NGOs.⁶⁰ It corresponds to Swiss corporatism, which entails close financial, administrative and personnel relationships between the actors in an institutional sphere. Thus, for a long time, the FOR Director was represented on the OSAR Board of Directors, and the NGOs' activities in the sphere of welfare, integration measures, ethno-specific care, etc., are financed by the FOR, as are also the representatives of relief organizations in asylum hearings. In spite of this state of dependence, OSAR and the FOR often represent contrary opinions in public, such as concerning the feasibility of return to countries of origin or the formulation of the Asylum Act. However, the mutual dependence prevents a too marked drifting apart of positions.

Against this background, it also becomes clear that the current attitude of the relief organizations consists of a mixture of criticism and signals expressing a willingness to compromise. However, in comparison with the crisis a decade ago, the NGOs seem to be

fighting much more openly for the continuation of the existing quota policy.⁶¹ We cannot judge from the outside whether this attitude is linked to the fact that the NGOs have noted improvements in the integration experiences of quota refugees, if it originated in the consolidation of interest structures, or if, just in difficult times and in view of domestic pressure, they would like to furnish tangible proof of Switzerland's humanitarian tradition. The NGOs call for a strict separation of "refugees of violence" (as in the case of those admitted within the scope of the Bosnian campaign) from quota refugees.⁶² Whereas in the admission of "refugees of violence", geographical restrictions could be accepted, the quota refugee policy is to remain universal. A reduction to individual humanitarian cases (vulnerable groups) would likewise run contrary to this rule of universality.

Today, irrespective of the differences in perspective, all the actors seem to share the view that a fundamental discussion on the future of Swiss quota policy is required and that a reasonable solution can be found on the basis of a thorough analysis of the situation. As a welcome sign of a new start, we should value the fact that the FOR has recently proposed the appointment of a joint working group which is to elaborate the fundamental principles of a future policy in the sphere of quota refugees.

Conclusion 5

Up to the end of the Vietnam War, Swiss policy was two-pronged. On the one hand, in the particularly dramatic refugee crises, Switzerland responded to the appeals of international relief organizations, generously admitting groups of refugees (for example from Hungary, Poland, Uganda and Tibet). On the other hand, it provided UNHCR with regular quotas for the admission of disabled or sick refugees.

With the end of the Cold War, the global conflict situation became diversified as a series of new small conflicts arose. Switzerland now started to offer UNHCR an annual quota for the admission of non-disabled refugees. This new concept also comprised an institutionalization of the reception centres, which resulted in a professionalization of assistance work. However, after a few years, the new policy entered a crisis triggered by the changing global situation in the sphere of asylum and refugees.

From a general point of view, Switzerland was affected by emerging asylum migration just as strongly as other European countries with asylum procedures established according to rule of law and with a tradition as asylum countries. She belongs to that group of European states particularly affected by the worldwide refugee problem and especially by the consequences of the Yugoslavian crisis, and which have so far, in relation to the size of their populations, participated rather overproportionally in burden-sharing. This evolution has had consequences on the financial, domestic and asylum policies, and if the admission of quota refugees has lost its attractiveness, it seems that the reason is to be found there. Basically, the Yugoslavian crisis constituted a challenge to the new concept of foreseeing for resettlement only relatively small groups of refugees from the various regional conflicts and of providing smaller quotas for this purpose.

The Nordic countries reacted to these problems by demanding reconsideration of the existing practice within the scope of UNHCR discussions. In Switzerland, the crisis was expressed by

a slowing down in the admission of quota refugees, which finally came to a virtual standstill. The basic concept was repeatedly challenged by various sides without a new strategy being formulated, so that the practice actually pursued in recent years has resembled a stop-and-go policy. Eventually, however, the need for a new concept for Swiss quota policy became urgent and the Federal Office for Refugees committed itself to the appointment of a working group.

What consequences may be drawn from these experiences for the future form of Swiss quota policy? On the one hand, the fact that Switzerland has been particularly affected by asylum migration and by Yugoslavian refugee problems favours a break in the admission of large groups of quota refugees until the situation in Bosnia has stabilized and at least a part of the refugees at present in Switzerland can return to their country. In the sense of global burden-sharing, as propagated by UNHCR, Switzerland's capacity would be fully utilized until the solution of the Bosnian refugee crisis. She could subsequently decide anew whether regular quotas for the admission of refugee groups were to be provided or whether to return to pre-1989 practice. At that time, large numbers of refugees were admitted in special programs as reactions to specific refugee crises parallel to the provision of regular annual quotas for disabled refugees.

However, it must be remembered that other host countries are also involved to a similar extent in the asylum crisis and the consequences of the Bosnian War. It is therefore appropriate, not least in view of considerations relevant to foreign policy (cf. Chap. 5), to signal Switzerland's readiness to work on behalf of a solution for global refugee problems within the multilateral framework of UNHCR. Even during a temporary reduction of the quotas for example, to the admission of humanitarian cases, this political will should be clearly signaled. The search for alternatives instigated by the Nordic countries could, for example, be given financial support. Among the alternatives, we find on the one hand the search for further host countries; on the other hand increased efforts aimed at providing care in the countries of first asylum.

In the same spirit, we should further examine whether Switzerland could adopt the basic idea of the budget model pursued by Sweden. The present quota policy continues to be financed under the budget item "Resettlement", but together with the payments into the UNHCR Fund in favour of the search for alternative solutions as well as the return program for provisionally admitted refugees from the former Yugoslavia. From this viewpoint, a temporary reduction of the quotas would release resources, for example, for increased integration efforts in countries of first asylum, but also for the solution of Bosnian refugee problem. If a large number of Bosnian refugees returned to their country, on the other hand, larger quotas could again be provided for the admission of refugee groups from other regions or individual groups of refugees admitted within the scope of special campaigns.

A model of this type would take account both of the global structure of conflict and its consequences for asylum policy. For the Yugoslavian crisis does not imply a fundamental change in this structure. It is the result of a typical regional conflict of an ethno-nationalistic nature which had replaced the proxy wars within the framework of the bloc confrontation. A new situation only developed due to the geographical proximity of the conflict to Western Europe. The basic deliberations which led to the formation of the new quota policy at the end of the eighties are therefore still valid. The option of a "pause for reflection" - the substitution of the quotas for group admissions by the admission of Bosnian refugees resp. return help - is

therefore most closely adapted to the present reality in the sphere of asylum. From the viewpoint of foreign policy, it is decisive that this option is so conceived that it cannot be interpreted as a wish on the part of Switzerland to dodge her responsibility towards a solution of the world's refugee problem.

7 The integration experiences of quota refugees in Switzerland: a preliminary approach

Opponents of the quota policy have sometimes argued that it is pointless to bring refugees to Switzerland, where they will be faced with great integration problems, as long as 85% of asylum applications are rejected. Integration in the country of first asylum or in the region of origin would, in contrast, be easier to manage. Those perceiving a contradiction between humanitarian objectives and integration experiences in Switzerland go a step further: in view of the great integration difficulties and the suffering involved, the admission for humanitarian reasons of refugees coming from countries of first asylum does not seem quite humane.⁶³

It cannot here be a question of basically assessing whether there is any sense in resettlement in a country that is totally different from a cultural and social point of view. This is probably not possible without having recourse to value judgements. How can suffering in a refugee camp be compared with that of uprooting a person in the context of an admission to a foreign country? We therefore recommend conducting the discussion at the level of concrete political options: in which cases of refugee crisis and for which category of persons does resettlement in the West represent both an objective and subjective necessity? According to the new UNHCR guidelines, only those persons are to be selected for resettlement for whom, after careful clarification of the circumstances, no other solution is in sight (Chap. 3.2). The Nordic Initiative could be the right instrument to encourage UNHCR to put its self-declared principles into practice (Chap. 3.3).

On the basis of these preliminary deliberations, I do not intend to enter upon a basic discussion of the integration question but will restrict myself to an analysis of actual integration work practised in Switzerland. At this point, I would like to stress that without extensive empirical research it is impossible to give a comprehensive description of the integration processes or an analysis of the effectiveness of integration assistance. The whole question of integration will only be discussed from a rather narrow perspective - i.e. with reference to the labour market - and in an unsystematic manner. The chapter therefore contains only references to the scope for manoeuvre for a future integration policy; within this framework it is not possible to provide a further-reaching discussion based on a solid evaluation of concrete options.

The present practice foresees a three-phase integration procedure for quota refugees - as moreover is the case in many other countries co-operating with UNHCR at this level (cf. Chap. 4.1). During the first phase, lasting about six months, the refugees become acquainted with one of the national languages and the basic rules of everyday life in Switzerland in reception centres. In the second phase, following placement in the individual Cantons, they are provided with the appropriate assistance by the relief organizations, whose costs are reimbursed by the Federal Government. Finally, after five years, the Cantons are responsible for welfare assistance to refugees.

Whereas the first phase is reserved for quota refugees in the Swiss practice - in contrast to that of Denmark - the second and third phases correspond to the care provided for all other recognized refugees. Within the scope of this study it is therefore meaningful to restrict ourselves to an evaluation of the first phase and merely to make a few references to whether,

on completion of the second phase, the integration perspectives of quota refugees are effectively different from those refugees recognized after individual asylum proceedings. Finally, we will also at least touch upon the question as to how far the integration experience of quota refugees in Switzerland differs from that in other host countries.

7.1 *Basic concept and effectiveness of reception centres*

In the three reception centres of Neuenegg, Morlon and Gersau, similar integration concepts have been developed and similar educational and orientation programs provided. The Gersau centre, which has been operational since 1993, is specialized in the assistance to disabled refugees and has also cared for a far higher number of such cases. The basic objective of reception centres is to provide the refugees with a "soft landing" in Swiss everyday life. The centres offer a protected environment within which the refugees may take the most important (above all linguistic) steps in their adjustment to a new life within a circle of persons of the same origin, thus without having to renounce their own culture completely.

Intensive language courses (10 to 20 lessons a week), active participation in daily life at the centre as well as practical information on life in Switzerland (from the use of public transport to that of an iron or a health insurance form), facilitate the refugees' adjustment to local life. In addition, there are projects *inter alia* aimed at making first contacts with the Swiss population possible. Experiences in the different centres vary to the degree of care needed by the refugees admitted. The care, in particular of refugees traumatized by war, torture or camps (for example from Iraq) causes great difficulties unless the necessary special facilities and personnel are available.

It is regrettable that the integration courses are largely limited to those spheres of daily life (teeth cleaning, advantages of a half-price season ticket, source of welfare money, Swiss habits regarding dress, etc.), which are hardly vital from the aspect of the actual integration process - which does not mean that they are pointless. The whole sphere of working life is, however, lacking, although according to empirical findings of a vast body of migration research, integration in the labour market represents the key factor to integration in all other spheres.⁶⁴ It would therefore also be meaningful to provide refugees with information on future work prospects, job-hunting techniques, the profiles of suitable jobs as well as even first work experiences, if only to avoid giving them false impressions of local conditions. A look at the courses offered in other host countries shows that in the USA, in Australia or Japan, for example, detailed information about possible places of work is given and that there are compulsory courses on job-hunting already during the second half of the stay in reception centres. It is clear that such courses are only relevant for refugees for whom overcoming traumatic experiences or medical problems is not a priority.

The fact that this sphere is almost totally neglected, however, even in the case of non-disabled refugees, could be linked with the working methods and basic perspectives of the NGOs, as these depend on the same financial source as the refugees (FOR); this is maybe why integration programs place more emphasis on the optimization of relations to the caring institutions than on the willingness to withdraw completely from the assistance and welfare system.

In addition, the placement of refugees in other host countries is not oriented towards the political and administrative criteria of the welfare system, but to that of the labour market (job availability).⁶⁵ In Switzerland, by comparison, placements are aimed at the welfare aspects of social integration: refugees are placed where they have relatives or friends and in particular where an NGO regional office is willing to take over their care. The fact that the present placement system could be improved is shown by the frequent accommodation of refugees where an NGO can provide an apartment,⁶⁶ and not necessarily where the refugees themselves would like to live or where their chances of integration would be best.

So far, there has not been a systematic evaluation of the "effectiveness" of the centres in fulfilling the task of initial integration, but we do have an excellent study on the experiences of Iranian refugees.⁶⁷ It compares a group of quota refugees, who had passed through the reception centre at Morlon and then frequently made use of assistance service for Iranian refugees, with a group of refugees who had come to Switzerland without being admitted to a reception centre and who were hardly aware of the existence of the assistance service. The latter group also comprises almost 50% of quota refugees, a large proportion of them admitted as medical cases. The two groups are more or less comparable with regard to family structure, the ages of the persons, the date of arrival in Switzerland and circumstances of flight, even if they are not representative from a statistical point of view.

On the basis of this study, the performance of the centres and the ethno-specific assistance service must be viewed with scepticism: whereas only a third of the men who had been admitted via a reception centre had found a job after five years in Switzerland, half of those in the control group had done so.⁶⁸ Accordingly, the persons from the control group are more frequently satisfied with their financial situation. Neither do the figures referring to other integration indicators favour the effectiveness of the reception centre: those in the control group regard their own knowledge of the language to be clearly better than the refugees from the reception centre,⁶⁹ visit the doctor much less frequently (although the hard core cases are to be found in the control group),⁷⁰ feel better mentally⁷¹ and are much more satisfied with the place where they live.⁷² The refugees themselves also express a certain reserve regarding the usefulness of the reception centres, attributing to them at the most a certain value as far as learning the language and getting accustomed to the Swiss mentality are concerned.⁷³

The results of this study must, however, be placed in the correct context. Firstly, it is not statistically representative, and the differences between the groups cannot therefore be examined with reference to their significance.

Secondly, the depressing picture drawn by the study of the integration process of refugees should be seen in relative terms, as persons of Iranian origin seem to be faced with special difficulties - in comparison to other refugee groups⁷⁴ - for example on the labour market.⁷⁵ This could be linked with the fact that they belong to a certain social class, their corresponding expectations with regard to work and the contradictory realities of the Swiss labour market as well as with their characteristic manner of reacting to this situation. In comparison, the integration process of the Vietnamese quota refugees, for example, ran much more smoothly. We suspect that in Vietnam there is no similar network of clientelistic relations to the state apparatus, by grace of which jobs and privileges are granted to members of the middle and high-class. Thus, these refugees do not have the same expectations with regard to welfare institutions in Switzerland. The Vietnamese frequently judge the loss of face

involved in dependency on the host country to be a greater evil than the acceptance of badly paid and subordinated employment with low social prestige.⁷⁶

Thirdly, it should be remembered that reception centres are merely intended to provide a "safe landing" and that it would be totally out of place to expect intensive care lasting six months to overcome the enormous difficulties faced by refugees when building up a new existence in completely new surroundings, above all as some of them are severely traumatized. It would be altogether wrong to state that integration should aim at the complete economic independence of all refugees. An objective of this kind would overlook the realities of the resettlement process.

On the other hand, what we have said above also means that maintaining reception centres is less justified by their effectiveness than by organizational and possibly financial advantages. It is in fact much easier to impart a national language and the rules of Swiss daily life to groups than to do so individually. When the three reception centres are fully occupied, a six months' stay costs approximately 18,000 Francs per person, including language and orientation courses. More detailed research would be needed to determine whether initial integration is shown to be less expensive via direct placement or through the Cantonal centres for asylum seekers - the solution applied in the case of the Bosnian refugees admitted to Switzerland. In such a comparison, criteria relative to quality should be given a high significance.

At a more basic level, we can ask ourselves about the effectiveness of integration assistance. According to a series of Canadian studies, the type of integration work (Canada has various sponsoring systems) has no great influence on the integration process itself: neither on the subjective perception, nor on the socio-cultural assimilation, nor on the integration in the labour market.⁷⁷ Factors such as the level of education, age, as also the mental health and adaptability of a person play a more decisive rôle. Thus, only a revision of selection criteria would bring about a considerable improvement in integration experience.

There are, however, possible courses of action in other spheres: experience has shown the non-recognition of foreign diplomas to be a central problem of professional integration, this being a problem that does not only affect refugees, of course. Would it not be appropriate, as in Dutch practice, to institute a variable conversion key whereby, depending on the length of training, skills acquired, curricula, etc., the foreign diplomas could be "translated" into Swiss equivalents? This would at least partly help to soften downward social mobility. The draft convention with the European Union, which is at present on the negotiating table in Brussels, could serve as a model for a solution of this nature.

7.2 Comparison of the integration perspectives of quota refugees and other recognized refugees

Within the scope of a general evaluation of the policy practised so far, the question arises as to the integration perspectives for quota refugees after the end of the second phase, i.e. after care by institutions specialized in refugee work has come to an end. The medium- and long-term cost burden depends on the level of integration as does at least partly the receptivity of the population.


A systematic assessment of integration experiences is difficult to attain as there is a lack of relevant research and data. A study carried out by the Swiss Forum for Migration (SFM) at least enables us to compare the professional integration of quota refugees with those of other refugee groups. In this way, we can evaluate whether persons admitted to Switzerland within the scope of an active policy of admission have more or less difficulty than other refugee groups to "find their way" in Switzerland and to start a new life.

Gainful employment is the sole integration indicator collected in the statistics of the Federal Aliens Office (Central Aliens Register). The simplest method is to compare various employment rates with one another, i.e. the proportion of those employed to the population of working age. In order to achieve meaningful results, however, we must take into account whether the employment rate is also linked to the age-related composition of a group (in persons over fifty, a new professional orientation is hardly possible in Switzerland), to the proportion of women, to the length of the stay in Switzerland (which has a great influence on the chance of finding and keeping a job), as well as to the Canton of residence, whose labour market shows varying degrees. In order to weigh up the relative influences of all these factors against one another, the statistical procedure of the so-called regression analysis may be used.

With the help of this method, we have compared the employment rates of persons admitted within large quotas since the fifties to those of other recognized refugees in Switzerland. The dates of arrival, recorded in the Central Aliens Register, enabled us at least to trace the largest groups of quota refugees (from Vietnam, Poland, Chile, Uganda, Iran and Iraq).⁷⁸ The statistical analysis comes to the conclusion that there are no significant differences between the employment rates of quota refugees and those of other recognized refugees, for which reason we have not given the figures in detail here. The result is all the more surprising as a high proportion of the quota refugees are disabled, sick or traumatized persons.

The long-term integration perspectives of quotas refugees and other groups of recognized refugees are thus almost identical. We can therefore fall back on the above-mentioned SFM study for a closer description of the integration process. If we again restrict ourselves to the employment rates as the only indicators for which we have reliable data, we see that the process of employment integration takes refugees a very long time. As shown in the following figure,⁷⁹ it takes approximately 10 years until refugees can actively participate in the working world in the same measure as the total resident population. According to the study quoted, the time factor itself acquires decisive significance for employment integration even if we consider that, in the course of time, Switzerland has admitted groups of refugees from different origins - most refugees before the Vietnam crisis were in fact of European origin.


Figure VIII:
Employment rates of refugees according to length of stay in Switzerland



Data: FAO

A comparison of the same process in asylum seekers and provisionally admitted refugees indicates that the difficulties in the course of the integration process are not directly linked with the level of "cultural distance" but rather with the special situation of the refugees: here comparable figures are already reached after five years, the integration process thus occurs significantly faster although more asylum seekers come from outside Europe than refugees.⁸⁰

Figure IX:
Employment rates of asylum seekers and provisionally admitted persons
according to length of stay in Switzerland



Data: FOR

Various factors can be made responsible for the comparatively greater difficulties of refugees: more cases of traumatization and other aggravating biographical background factors, different reasons for flight and, above all, different incentive structures on the part of the welfare systems for asylum seekers and recognized refugees. Finally, a further point to be considered is the fact that each tightening of the restrictions governing the grant of asylum tends to result in persons with greater integration difficulties being recognized as refugees. We would hesitate to give a more precise and further-reaching explanation without additional and systematic research.

7.3 The integration process in an international comparison

We can also compare the integration experience of refugees settled in Switzerland with those in other host countries. Is adjustment in Switzerland easier or more difficult than in other societies? Due to their high number and wide geographical dispersion, the group of Vietnamese refugees lends itself to a comparison of this kind. There has not, however, been a systematic evaluation of the extensive literature on this subject⁸¹ and it exceeds the framework

of the present study. We will only attempt to make a comparison here with the classical immigration countries. Experiences in other European states are probably not very different.⁸² The working world is again a suitable field for comparison, as these data lend themselves best to this purpose.

According to a representative study, 17% of all Vietnamese in Australia (after an average stay of 6 years) received one form or another of welfare assistance. They were three times more frequently unemployed than persons born in Australia but their employment rate lay only about 6% lower (52%) than those of old-established inhabitants.⁸³ Similar data are reported from Canada⁸⁴ and the USA,⁸⁵ where after a five-year stay only 28% of the resettled Vietnamese were still receiving financial assistance from the government (educational/training grants and support for medical care included). In Switzerland, in contrast, the employment rate of Indochina refugees, even after a stay of ten years (1995), lies at about 57%, 20% below that of the permanent Swiss resident population. However, according to information given by the Federal Office for Industry and Labour, unemployment is only slightly below the overall average for Switzerland.⁸⁶

These figures must be interpreted in the context of the welfare and immigration systems in question. All classical immigration countries also apply actual immigration criteria, in the first place in the selection of quota refugees, i.e. they stress the refugees' ability to integrate in the working world. Secondly, all immigration countries stand in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of welfare systems. These are not based on the concept of the standardization of living conditions for all citizens and the granting of a right to minimal standards of living for all, like the European welfare states, but differentiate between the "deserving poor" and the "undeserving poor". Only the latter, who have fallen on difficult times without any responsibility on their part (such as single mothers, widows, the sick and elderly), should be supported by the state. Thirdly, the labour markets in the immigration countries are far more flexible and open. The unemployment rates relating to immigrants lie on the whole only slightly above or sometimes even below those of long-established inhabitants, whereas they are twice or three times as high in European countries.⁸⁷

Conclusion 6

The integration assistance to quota refugees in Switzerland has three stages: first of all, during six months the persons are taught one of the national languages and introduced to the basic facts of Swiss life in a reception centre. Following placement in a Canton, an NGO assumes responsibility for individual integration assistance on the same basis as in the case of refugees recognized in asylum proceedings. After five years, the Cantons are responsible for the care of the refugees.

On the basis of a comparative study, the conclusion may be drawn that reception centres have no influence on the medium-term integration prospects of quota refugees. A point in favour of retaining reception centres, on the other hand, is the fact that they make it possible to organize language and orientation courses in groups and to carefully prepare the subsequent placement. In order to avoid dependency on assistance and the development of a "clientele mentality", preparations for job-hunting can also be made during the stay in the centres.

Placement less in accordance with the NGOs's offer of accommodation, but rather aimed at future integration and work prospects is also to be recommended, seeing that all the studies carried out so far show that professional integration is the key factor for a satisfactory situation in all other spheres. Decisive progress would also be made if a solution could be found for the problem of having foreign diplomas recognized.

Our provisional analysis comes to the conclusion that the professional integration of quota refugees is not in a worse state than that of other recognized refugees, however significantly worse than that of asylum seekers. The building up of a new life and integration in the labour market represent a very lengthy process for refugees which is achieved only after ten years, even in a satisfactory labour market situation. In view of this fact, we should be wary of illusions regarding the effectiveness of integration assistance. A basic improvement in integration prospects would only be achieved by means of a selection of quota refugees that was systematically orientated to immigration criteria as well as by a reorganization of labour markets and welfare systems, for example according to the Anglo-Saxon pattern. Neither of these is probably feasible against the background of the political conditions in Switzerland and does not correspond to the purpose of Swiss quota policy as practised so far. This does not mean, however, that in future the integration perspectives could not be attributed an increased significance in the admission of refugees.

8 Estimate of costs

The problem of integration is closely linked to the question of costs, as integration difficulties are directly reflected in higher welfare costs. However, anyone speaking of costs with reference to refugees rapidly runs the risk of being reproached on the grounds of immorality. In fact, at least according to the human rights conception prevailing in Western Europe, no costs are too high to save human life or to eliminate inhumane living conditions. Thus, Western medicine spends enormous sums on prolonging a single life, a fact which is not basically challenged. On the other hand, in view of the tight funds available to combat world misery, it is nevertheless also legitimate to ask about opportunity costs of a certain form of humanitarian policy: who and how many people cannot be helped if we decide to help this one group in particular? It is in this sense that we will below try to estimate the total costs of the quota policy practised so far.

The Asylum Act stipulates that refugees are given welfare assistance by the Federal Government until they are granted permanent residence (Art. 31 Asylum Act), whereby the NGOs or a Canton pay the welfare benefits and are subsequently reimbursed by the Federal Government. However, the Federal Council may also, in accordance with Art. 31 para 4 Asylum Act, determine that the Federal Government also pays for the welfare of disabled or elderly refugees after they have taken up permanent residence. Art. 44 Asylum Order 2 requires that the Federal Government is responsible for the welfare costs of refugees also after permanent residence has been granted if they entered the country within the framework of the UNHCR special program for disabled persons or with a refugee group, were sick, elderly or disabled, as well as in the case of unaccompanied children and young people.

In the period from 1989 to 1996, Switzerland admitted 2,835 refugees in accordance with Art. 22 Asylum Act. The Bosnian refugees admitted within the scope of the Bosnian campaign are included in this figure. 391 members of this group entered the country as disabled refugees (incl. family members). It is only possible to make a rough estimate of the total costs and the method of cost reimbursement makes it impossible to give a statement of costs corresponding to the amount actually spent.

In contrast, welfare expenditure on disabled refugees, for whom the Federal Government remains competent, has been especially compiled for this study. In order to calculate welfare contributions made to non-disabled quota refugees, we have applied two different methods:

- On the basis of random sampling of 150 dossiers made by the FOR, the average total assistance costs per year and person amount to 11,500 Francs between 1989 and 1996. Another FOR estimate - less precise - based on overall accounts, reaches total assistance costs of 13,750 Francs per person for 1994.⁸⁹ In contrast to the first figure, the costs of care are included here. We assume average total assistance costs of 12,000 Francs. In order to calculate welfare costs, we must take into account the fact that gainfully-employed refugees do not receive welfare benefits. The employment rates of quota refugees can be very reliably estimated on the basis of the above-mentioned SFM study. However, this does not allow a direct conclusion with regard to dependency on the welfare system, as a gainfully-employed person may be supporting further family members. We have adopted the hypothesis that a married person who is gainfully employed supports two others. The average proportion of married persons is known (it amounts to 44%).

- On the basis of a random selection of approximately one third of the dossiers which were evaluated by FOR, it is possible to calculate the total costs incurred per year of admission: the costs of the random sample are divided by the number of persons contained therein and then multiplied by the total number of refugees admitted to the country in that particular year. This calculation does *not* take into account the fact that the welfare costs of persons arriving in 1989 have been paid by the Cantons since approximately 1994 and those of the group entering in 1990 since approximately 1995. The estimates for these two groups should therefore be lower than those resulting from the first method.

We reach surprisingly similar results with the help of these two completely different methods of calculation. The list on the next page represents the welfare costs by refugee groups, i.e. assistance benefits allocated between 1989 and 1996 to the group of refugees entering Switzerland in 1989, between 1990 and 1996 to the group arriving in 1990, etc. (Table 1).

On the basis of this estimate, the admission by groups of 2,835 refugees, in accordance with Art. 22 Asylum Act, has cost between 140 and 150 million Francs of welfare assistance since 1989. Included in these figures are the approximately 1,700 refugees admitted within the framework of the Bosnian campaign. The estimate does not include: firstly, general care and counselling costs and, secondly, the costs for the admission infrastructure of the Bosnian refugees. Thirdly, other cost units, such as the health insurance funds and disability insurance, are not taken into account. The disability insurance is responsible for the costs after the fifth year in the case of disabled persons. The corresponding amounts for the groups of disabled persons entering the country in 1989 and 1990 are not included in the list of costs. Fourthly, a large number of persons came to Switzerland via family reunification outside the quotas; these persons are not included in our estimate. For example, according to the FOR, the total number of persons finally admitted in the case of the special campaign for 200 Bosnian refugees amounted to 806. Our estimate is thus very conservative.


Table 1: Estimated costs of the admission of refugee groups since 1989

Year of entry	Actual assistance costs up to 1996 for disabled refugees (number of persons in brackets)	Estimate on the basis of sample audit: assistance costs up to 1996 for other refugees admitted acc. to Art. 22 Asylum Act (number of persons in brackets)	Estimate on the basis of employment rates: assistance costs up to 1996 for other refugees admitted acc. to Art. 22 Asylum Act (number of persons in brackets)	Annual operating costs of the three first integration centres (on the basis of the 1996 budget)
1989	3 321 403 (49)	5 238 569 (129)	8 088 486 (129)	
1990	6 476 340 (86)	9 692 013 (226)	13 191 526 (226)	3 460 000
1991	2 496 239 (37)	14 424 493 (272)	14 453 423 (272)	3 460 000
1992	3 366 578 (65)	11 229 465 (269)	12 765 229 (269)	3 460 000
1993	2 973 565 (90)	38 952 621 (1027)	42 551 469 (1027)	4 700 000
1994	2 000 541 (56)	6 173 187 (224)	7 472 242 (224)	4 700 000
1995	(0)	(3 872 438)	3 872 438 (168)	4 700 000
1996	(0)	(1 640 600)	1 640 600 (137)	4 700 000
<i>Total</i>	<i>20 634 667 (391)</i>	<i>91 223 386 (2444)</i>	<i>104 035 413 (2444)</i>	<i>29 180 000</i>
Total costs: approx. 140 to 155 mill. Francs				

When planning a future quota policy, it is just as important to have an estimate of welfare costs per person as to know the total costs. As mentioned, the average total assistance costs for one person from the sphere of asylum may be estimated at between 11,500 (without care costs) and 13,750 Francs (including care costs). The total costs devoted to disabled refugees being known, we can deduce that the total assistance costs for a person admitted in this category of refugees amount to approximately 16,400 Francs (without care). This calculation, however, includes family members admitted together with a disabled or sick person. If we only look at disabled refugees without family members, welfare costs vary between 11,000 and 250,000 Francs per year and person.

Besides the total costs, the average costs incurred per person are also of interest, because these figures reflect the difference in need and the level of dependence on welfare of the various categories of persons. Figure X shows the average level of welfare assistance paid by the Federal Government per year to various categories of persons from the sphere of asylum. The figures related to asylum seekers are based on an overall account and show the average annual welfare costs and accommodation costs, but do not include care costs.⁹⁰ The rising average costs are probably due to deteriorating economic trends and diminishing prospects on the labour market.

Figure X:
Average annual welfare costs (in Swiss francs) per person from the sphere of asylum, 1989 to 1994



The figures for disabled quota refugees are based on a complete compilation of the costs reimbursed (without care). In contrast to figures for asylum seekers, they refer to refugee cohorts and not to annual averages. Thus, the figure for 1989 indicates the annual assistance received between 1989 and 1996 by persons admitted to Switzerland in 1989. The fluctuations are largely due to the varying levels of care needed by those persons admitted in any one year. As already mentioned, the costs vary, depending on the degree of disability or illness, amounting to between 11,000 and 250,000 Francs per year and person.

The figures for non-disabled quota refugees likewise refer to refugee cohorts, whereby the calculations are based on the random selection of 150 dossiers (589 persons). The variations in costs are not only explained by the deterioration in work prospects but also by the fact that the employment rate rises with growing length of stay and that welfare contributions paid on average since the year of admission correspondingly sink. Persons entering the country in 1989 therefore received less assistance money on average during the total length of stay than groups admitted later.

Conclusion 7

What may be deduced from these different calculations of costs? First of all, we would like to stress once again that the calculations represent rough estimates and in no way give a precise and complete picture of costs. This is not possible without more extensive and lengthy research. On the basis of these rather conservative estimates, we can at least infer that the costs of welfare care are relatively high and, due to the bad situation on the labour market, in the process of rising. On the other hand, although the roughly estimated annual costs accruing to the Federal Government through the admission of quota refugees since 1989, including the Bosnian campaign, amount to approximately 17 to 20 million Francs, they only make up a small part of the FOR budget. This estimate, however, does not take the cumulative effects into account, i.e. the financial consequences of earlier admissions are not included.

A somewhat surprising result of the cost estimates is that welfare expenditure on disabled refugees may in individual cases be very high, but considered on average not significantly higher than the financial assistance given to non-disabled refugees. This could be linked to the fact that medical treatment and the stimulating effect it achieves improve chances of integration. In spite of individual cases in which the costs of care are high, average total assistance costs are only about one third higher than those of the other quota refugees.

It remains to be seen to what extent expenditure arising in Switzerland as a result of an active admission of refugees is justified from the humanitarian point of view, within the scope of the importance attributed to Switzerland's humanitarian tradition at national and international level, with regard to the global situation in the sphere of asylum and the financial burden on the Confederation. This is, however, a question that must be answered politically and the present report is not in a position to reply to it.

C Overview

9 Possible courses of action and recommendations

On the basis of the analyses presented so far, we are now in a position to list the most important possible courses of action. First of all, a basic decision must be made between the two following : to continue offering quotas to UNHCR for the admission of refugees or if - like, for example, Germany, France and Great Britain - Switzerland would prefer to respond to UNHCR appeals only in the event of particularly dramatic situations that are of international significance. In order to make this basic decision, different points of view from the following spheres must be taken into account: financial policy, asylum policy, as well as foreign and domestic policies. The decision will then depend on the weighting of the perspectives.

Let us start with foreign policy considerations. At a time when Switzerland's image abroad is gravely tarnished, a break with her humanitarian tradition - to which the policy practised so far has been devoted - would certainly be linked with political costs. According to our analysis, the humanitarian tradition in a sense legitimizes the basic position of neutrality adopted by Switzerland in the sphere of foreign policy (cf. Chap. 5). It will retain this functional link in the foreseeable future. Moreover, to renounce Swiss quota policy would cause some consternation within the community of host countries a time when UNHCR, under pressure on the part of the Nordic countries, is endeavouring - seemingly with success - to find new host countries.

From the financial point of view, everything speaks against a continuation of the present admission policy as the burden, especially in the sphere of welfare, is considerable (Chap. 8).

From the point of view of asylum policy, the assessment is more finely shaded: on the one hand, the new policy formulated after the end of the Cold War that foresees providing UNHCR with regular quotas, also for non-disabled refugees (cf. Chap. 6.2), corresponds to the global evolution of conflicts and refugee crisis: the few large conflicts occurring periodically within the scope of the confrontation between the blocs, on behalf of which special admission campaigns for refugees could be mounted, have been replaced by a great number of smaller and regionally diversified conflicts (Chap. 2). Consequently, the refugee flows are multiplying and diversifying. The Bosnian War fits into this pattern, even if the geographical proximity placed European host countries in a special situation.

On the other hand, Switzerland belongs to those European states which have been most affected by the Bosnian refugee crisis and which are also hosting a large number of asylum seekers (Chap. 6.3). This argument favours redimensioning the Swiss commitment on behalf of admitting quota refugees: Switzerland could limit admission to individual humanitarian cases, for example, until the Bosnian refugee problem has been solved. In doing so, Switzerland should express her clear will - for example by creating a comprehensive budget item for resettlement - to again admit large numbers of refugees from UNHCR camps following the solution of the Bosnian refugee crisis. Should this solution be chosen, the

Swedish model mentioned in the fifth conclusion (Chap. 6) would be appropriate as a point of reference.

If Switzerland thus decides on a continuation of the present policy and on further co-operation with UNHCR, it would be in her interest to support the discussions on the "Nordic Initiative". This would give UNHCR the clear signal that the European host countries are only willing to continue providing quotas if all possibilities of a regional solution, such as resettlement or provisional care in the country of first asylum, have been seriously examined and resettlement - in accordance with declared UNHCR policy - actually represents the "last possible solution" (Chap. 3.2).

The quota policy could - subject to a corresponding fundamental decision - be continued in various ways. On the one hand, the pre-1989 policy could be reactivated: Switzerland regularly offers UNHCR small quotas for the admission of disabled refugees; at the same time she signals her willingness, as in the case of Bosnia, and corresponding to the Swiss post-war tradition of also admitting large groups in individual refugee catastrophes (see Chap. 6.1). In this case, the reception centres for non-disabled refugees should be closed and the admission of large refugee groups would be organized *ad hoc*, respectively via centres for asylum seekers. For disabled refugees, either a specialized reception centre could be retained or, as before 1989, direct placement and care through the NGO regional offices could be envisaged. Another point to be discussed is whether more precise selection criteria should be formulated for medical cases which (in accordance with UNHCR's present efforts) guarantee that only refugees are resettled in Switzerland who a) cannot be treated in a country with a cheaper but high-grade medical infrastructure and b) have a real chance of improving their situation by means of medical treatment. Delegations with teams of medical specialists *in situ* could ensure that these criteria are taken into account in the selection process.

A second possibility would consist of reviewing the present policy and, with a clear expression of will, placing it on a firmer basis. In this case, a regular rhythm for the admission of refugee groups should be established to facilitate the medium-term planning of admission and integration work, informing UNHCR about current Swiss admission criteria (updated list of safe countries, etc.), to once more place the interaction between FOR and NGOs on a basis of mutual trust with the perspective of a shared medium-term task. The level of future quotas should not be lower than the number of refugees actually admitted in the nineties (approx. 200 persons), if Switzerland is not to compare too badly with the other host countries (cf. the figures in Chap. 4.2).

Thirdly, it would be conceivable to orientate Swiss quota policy increasingly to integration prospects, i.e. in view of the costs of integration via the welfare system (cf. Chap. 7.2 and 8) and try to raise the chances of a successful medium-term integration in the labour market. The selection criteria should be more finely shaded and correspond more closely to integration prospects than hitherto. A thorough analysis of the actual integration process should form the basis of such a modification of admission policy so that the criteria could be formulated accordingly. However, we should guard against illusions: a change to an actual immigration policy and a welfare system based on proof of need, which facilitated the introduction of the sponsoring system in the Anglo-Saxon host countries, leading to comparatively better integration perspectives for refugees, could probably not be considered for Switzerland.

Once again, the choice between the three options (return to pre-1989 policy, maintaining the policy of the nineties, modification with an increased emphasis on integration perspectives) depends on the weighting of financial, asylum, domestic and foreign policy aspects. From a financial and domestic policy point of view, a return to pre-1989 policy would be favoured, with increased emphasis on the integration aspects as the second-best solution. From the viewpoint of foreign policy, it would be advisable to renew the policy of the nineties or, as the second-best option, to choose modification of the present policy. Considering the general Swiss situation in the sphere of asylum, the ideal solution would be - possibly after a temporary reduction of the quotas - to admit quotas at the level of the nineties and/or to increasingly orientate admission to integration prospects.

Should Switzerland decide to maintain or to modify her quota policy, the next point to be discussed is whether the selection of refugees is to be effected by delegations *in situ* or on the basis of decisions on dossiers. In the modified model directed at integration prospects, it would hardly be possible to avoid sending out selection delegations as these would maybe have to carry out aptitude tests (for example on language ability).

Furthermore, the organizational framework in which the admission of refugees is to take place must be defined. Two possible solutions are either initial integration assistance given by the NGOs or by the Cantons, which could utilize the existing infrastructure for asylum seekers. In the second option, there should be a guarantee that quota refugees are not accommodated together with asylum seekers or provisionally admitted refugees in order to avoid unequal treatment within the same group. In contrast, a specialized reception centre could be retained for the admission of disabled refugees. Should the model "orientation to integration perspectives" be given preference, the initial integration courses and placement criteria would have to be modified as mentioned above (cf. Chap. 7.1).


Finally, it must be determined who is responsible for the care of refugees after their definitive settlement as well as the objectives of this care. There are three possibilities to be discussed: firstly, the continuation of the present practice, i.e. the Federal Government continues to entrust the NGOs with care of the refugees until permanent residence permits are granted. Secondly, a possibility being discussed at present is to compensate the Cantons for the care of refugees instead of the NGOs; it is up to them whether they then delegate the implementation of integration programs to the NGOs. Thirdly - in the sense of a suggestion - it is also conceivable that, instead of the NGOs, the Communes assume refugee-specific care, as is the case in the Scandinavian countries (cf. Chap. 4.1), irrespective of whether they are reimbursed for this by the Cantons or by the Federal Government. In return, the NGOs could have the no less intensive task of advising the Communes on the establishment of integration programs and of providing specialized services. An advantage of such a solution could be that the caring institutions would have to bear the financial and social consequences of an unsuccessful integration after the permanent residence of the refugees in question and would therefore be interested in providing efficient integration assistance.

The limits of the present study do not allow us to examine more closely the financial implications, the qualitative advantages and disadvantages of the individual models as well as the integration effects to be expected. This would require a more detailed understanding of the actual integration processes, which cannot be achieved without considerable empirical work. As moreover, a political decision is foreseen as to whether the care of recognized refugees

should basically be handed over to the Cantons, it is not appropriate to deliberate further on this matter.

Summarizing, we would like to stress once more that the various courses of action under discussion may be differently assessed from the perspectives of the humanitarian tradition of Swiss foreign policy, the situation in the sphere of asylum, the financial costs as well as the consequences of integration policy. The decision on the future form of Swiss quota policy thus depends essentially on the weighting of the various perspectives, and is of an eminently political character. At this point, we have to bring to an end the deliberations conducted within the framework of the present study. The following figure summarizes the possible courses of action in the form of a decision tree.

Figure XI:
Possible courses of action



Endnotes

¹ UNHCR (Division of International Protection), 1996. Resettlement Handbook. Version 1996. Geneva: UNHCR. Chap. 1.

² For the history of the international refugee regime, see Wiltrud von Glahn. 1992. Der Kompetenzwandel internationaler Flüchtlingshilfsorganisationen - vom Völkerbund bis zu den Vereinten Nationen. Baden-Baden : Nomos.

³ Walter Kälin and Alberto Ackermann. 1992. Rückkehr von Gewaltflüchtlingen in Sicherheit und Würde: Ein neues Instrument der Flüchtlingsausienpolitik? Schweizerischer Wissenschaftsrat, FER 121. p. 29f.

⁴ Cf. Pierre-Alain Praz. 1991. Propositions pour une nouvelle organisation du travail au sein de la Kontingentsausschuss. Caritas. Manuscript.

⁵ UNHCR. 1996. Note on Implementing Resettlement: Follow up to the Evaluation Study. Formal Consultation on Resettlement, 24 June 1996. FCR/96/02. Manuscript.

⁶ Caritas. 1992. Minutes of the meeting with Mrs Mary Petevi (UNHCR) of 19 May 1992. Manuscript.

⁷ The term comes from Loescher and Scanlan. 1986. Calculated Kindness. Refugees and America's Half-Open Door, 1945 to Present. New York: the Free Press.

⁸ Hereinafter acc. to: Inspection and Evaluation Service. 1995. Resettlement in the 1990s : A Review of Policy and Practice. An Evaluation Summary. Geneva: UNHCR (manuscript).

⁹ See, for example, from New Zealand's point of view: Refugee and Migrant Service. 1996. The Changing Face of Resettlement in the 90's. A Paper Prepared for the Global Resettlement Consultations. Manuscript.

¹⁰ The following problems occurring in the selection process are described in detail:

- Many mandate refugees, i.e. those fulfilling UNHCR's definition of a refugee (cf. Handbook III/2), are not considered as refugees according to the specific laws of host countries and are consequently not admitted there.
- Many dossiers were badly prepared.
- Often, in the selection of humanitarian cases, UNHCR hardly considered the aspect of protection, which is of central importance in resettlement.
- Some of the medical cases were proposed for resettlement because the costs of treatment in the camps represented a burden on the budget and not because medical care was not available locally. The UNHCR Handbook (IV/I) states that its personnel are often placed under violent pressure by persons wishing to emigrate in order to force a resettlement.
- The guidelines on resettlement were very differently applied by the individual UNHCR field offices, leading to incoherence and a lack of transparency.
- When medical, social/mental cases that were particularly difficult are not accepted by the country first requested, UNHCR proposes them for another country although they have no family links there.
- Whereas the decision on resettlement in the case of Indochina refugees was implemented in a comprehensive plan, in the most recent case of mass resettlement of Iraqis in Saudi-Arabian camps, no clear, internationally harmonized measures are foreseen. The case, classified as urgent, has been dealt with very

slowly. Thus, it took two years until the dossiers were ready. Due to this low-prestige policy, the admission countries displayed an extremely reserved attitude with regard to the admission of the refugees.

- A further criticism, partly formulated as self-criticism on the part of UNHCR, is the fact that UNHCR resettlement campaigns had and still have the effect of a pull factor. This is clearly shown today by the example of the Ogoni refugees from Nigeria, living in Benin. Shortly before the visit of an announced American selection delegation, the number of camp inmates multiplied (see UNHCR. 1996. Position Paper. Resettlement of Ogoni Nigerians. Formal Consultations on Resettlement, 24 June 1996. FCR 96/PP/10). Consequently, UNHCR is endeavouring to be cautious when announcing resettlement programs as also in the use of consistent criteria (cf. Handbook).

¹¹ Verena Müller-Tobler. 1987. Die Aufnahme von Sonderprogrammflüchtlingen in der Schweiz. Erfahrungen und Perspektiven der Hilfswerke. Manuscript.

¹² Wiltrud von Glahn, op. Cit., p. 162f.

¹³ Jacqueline Desbarats, 1992. Institutional and policy interactions among countries and refugee flows. In: Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean Lim und Hania Zlotnik (Hrsg.), International Migration Systems. A Global Approach. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 294.

¹⁴ L. Gordenker. 1987. Refugees in International Politics: New York: Columbia University Press. p. 150.

¹⁵ See the report on the Formal Consultations with Governments on Resettlement Activities of 14 October 1995.

¹⁶ Refugee Policy Commission. 1995. Swedish Refugee Policy in a Global Perspective. Summary of a Report to the Swedish Government by the Parliamentary Refugee Policy Commission. Manuscript.

¹⁷ Cf. also Canadian Council for Refugees. 1996. Minutes of the First American NGO/HCR Regional Meeting on Resettlement, 26 March 1996, Toronto. Manuscript.

¹⁸ Inter-Church Committee for Refugees, Sponsorship Group. 1994. Refugee Settlement to Canada. Manuscript.

¹⁹ The figures are to be found in United States Mission to International Organizations, Geneva. 1996. Refugee Resettlement in the United States. Manuscript.

Loescher and Scanlan, op. cit., have given a detailed analysis of the relationship between the Cold War and USA asylum policy. According to these authors, 95% of refugees admitted during this period came from Communist countries, whereas refugees from Latin American dictatorships, for example from El Salvador, Haiti or Guatemala, hardly had a chance of being admitted.

²⁰ Hereinafter acc. to the UNHCR 1996 Resettlement Handbook.

²¹ United States Mission to International Organizations, Geneva. 1996. Refugee Resettlement in the United States. Manuscript.

²² Paul James Rutledge. 1992. The Vietnamese Experience in America. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. 86 ff.

²³ Hereinafter acc. to: Robert Sayers. 1989. Resettling refugees: The Dutch model. In: Danièle Joly and Robin Cohen (eds.), Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees. Aldershot : Avebury

²⁴ Eszter Körmendi. 1989. Refugees in Denmark. In : Danièle Joly and Robin Cohen (eds.), Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees. Aldershot: Avebury.

²⁵ Alfred Jensen. 1983. Integration einer privilegierten Ausländergruppe - Kontingentsflüchtlinge aus Südostasien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Doctoral thesis in social sciences presented at the Ruhr University of Bochum, Department of Social Sciences. Manuscript.

²⁶ Refugee and Migrant Service (New Zealand). 1996. RMS Presentation to the Regional Resettlement Consultations Canberra, May 17th, 1996. Manuscript.

²⁷ Graeme Hugo. 1990. Adaption of Vietnamese in Australia: An assessment based on 1986 census results. In : Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences 18(1) : 182-210.

²⁸ Claudio Bolzmann. 1993. Les métamorphoses de la barque. Les politiques d'asile, d'insertion et de retour de la Suisse à l'égard des exilés chiliens. Geneva : Les éditions IES, no 2, p. 28 - 39.

²⁹ On the basis of the figures presented by Claudio Bolzmann (op. cit. p. 21), it can be calculated that Australia admitted 50 Chilean refugees per 100,000 inhabitants, Canada 45, Sweden 160, Spain 72, Switzerland 44, France 27, Italy and Belgium 20, Germany 3 and, in contrast, the USA 0.8. These figures also include those refugees who were admitted to the countries in question via individual asylum proceedings.

³⁰ Not included are the admissions of medical cases chosen in the camps by selection delegations. Not included either are the admissions of hardship cases from Bosnia.

³¹ Cf. Walter Kälin. 1986. Verfassungsgrundsätze der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. In : Referate und Mitteilungen des Schweizerischen Juristenvereins 120:255-383.
Urs Altermat. 1992. Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart (1945-1991) in : Alois Riklin, Hans Haug et Raymond Probst (eds.), Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. Berne: Haupt.

³² Cf. on this subject Walter Kälin, op. cit., p. 300 f.

³³ The following remarks are based on Daniel Thürer. 1986. Humanität und Neutralität - zum politischen und völkerrechtlichen Spannungsverhältnis zweier Grundprinzipien der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik. In: Yvo Hangartner und Stefan Trechsel (eds.), Völkerrecht im Dienste des Menschen. Festschrift für Hans Haug. Berne : Haupt.

³⁴ Cf. Altermann, op. cit.; Hans von Greyerz 1977. Der Bundesstaat seit 1848. In : Handbuch der Schweizer Geschichte, vol. 2. Zurich : Berichthaus. p. 128 f.

³⁵ Quoted from Thürer, op. cit., p. 293.

³⁶ Jean-Claude Favez. 1996. La recherche d'une politique extérieure. In : Georg Kreis (Edit.), Die Schweiz im internationalen System der Nachkriegszeit, 1943-1950. Itinera, vol. 18.

³⁷ Antoine Fleury. 1996. La Suisse et le défi du multilatéralisme. In: Georg Kreis (ed.), Die Schweiz im internationalen System der Nachkriegszeit, 1943-1945. Itinera, vol. 18.

³⁸ Wiltrud von Glahn, op. cit., chap. 3.

³⁹ On Switzerland's not very creditable refugee policy during the War, see the study - still the most detailed - by Carl Ludwig. 1955. Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz in den Jahren 1933 bis 1955. Report to the Federal Council. Berne.

To place the Ludwig report in context, see Jacques Picard. 1994. Die Schweiz und die Juden, 1933-1945. Schweizerischer Antisemitismus, jüdische Abwehr und internationale Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik. Zurich: Chronos. p. 145 - 154.

⁴⁰ Conseil fédéral, 1994. La politique extérieure de la Suisse dans les années 90. Berne : Bureau de l'intégration DFAE/DFEP.

⁴¹ Andreas Wenger and Jeronim Perovic. 1995. Das schweizerische Engagement im ehemaligen Jugoslawien. Über Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der Aussenpolitik eines neutralen Kleinstaates. Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung. No 36.

⁴² Jean-Daniel Bise. 1995. Interview US avec journaliste hollandais sur collaboration avec le HCR. ODR, manuscript.

⁴³ Verena Müller-Tobler, op. cit.

⁴⁴ See in this connection the study by Beda Marthy and Kathrin Oester. 1984. Zur Integration von Indochinaflüchtlingen in der Schweiz. In: *Asiatische Flüchtlinge in der Schweiz. Fragen zur Integration*. *Studia Ethnographica Friburgensia*, vol. 12. Fribourg: Universitätsverlag.

⁴⁵ Verena Müller-Tobler, op. cit., p. 22 f.

⁴⁶ Walter Schmid. 1987. Zur Aufnahme von Sonderprogrammflüchtlingen. Empfehlungen der Hilfswerke. Manuscript.

⁴⁷ Cf. the statement of the Conference of Heads of Refugee Services on DFW criteria regarding the admission of special program refugees. May 1989. Manuscript.

⁴⁸ Cf. Claudio Bolzmann, op. cit., p. 58 to 64.

⁴⁹ Federal Council report of 15 May 1991 on aliens and refugee policy, p. 26: "The active admission of refugee quotas from countries of first admission or the prophylactic provision of small quotas is to be continued in the interest of an active international refugee policy. The condition remains that relevant admission structures can be made ready. ...The Federal Council wishes to implement the admission of quota refugees more frequently as an instrument of an active human rights policy."

⁵⁰ Federal Department of Justice and Police. 1991. Admission of 500 refugees per year from countries of first asylum in the years 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. Request to the Federal Council of 2 July 1991.

⁵¹ Federal Office for Refugees. 1992. Guidelines on the admission of quota refugees.

⁵² Cf. Caritas Suisse. 1990. Accueil de réfugiés dans le cadre de contingents. Politique générale et situation actuelle. Manuscript.

⁵³ Cf. Jean-Daniel Bise. 1995, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Michael Jandl. 1995. Structure and Costs of the Asylum Systems in Seven European Countries. Vienna: ICMPD, manuscript. The relevant data are to be found on pages 97 (Germany) and 143 (Sweden).

⁵⁵ Pierre-Alain Praz. 1993. Memo. Remarques sur les derniers développements concernant la politique de contingents en vue de l'ouverture de Gersau. Caritas. Manuscript.

⁵⁶ Urs Scheidegger. 1993. Admission of quota refugees in 1994. Letter to Markus Loosli, Swiss Organization for Aid to Refugees.

⁵⁷ Urs Scheidegger. 1994. Admission of quota refugees in 1994. Letter to Markus Loosli, SOAR.

⁵⁸ Cf. the relevant decision taken by the FOR Main Division for Asylum Procedure not to grant a permit to quota refugees from Ethiopia, Zaire and Angola. FOR. 1996. Demandes de réintégration du HCR concernant des réfugiés africains : préavis de la section principale Procédure. Note interne. The problems are also recognized by the NGOs: cf. Caritas. 1995. Documentation on the introduction of new personnel to RCS Refugee Services. Quota policy/integration centre. Manuscript.

⁵⁹ Conference of Cantonal welfare directors. 1995. Admission of 300 Iraqi refugees from Saudi-Arabia within the scope of a special program. Letter to Federal Councillor Koller.

⁶⁰ Cf. on this subject Walter Stöckli. 1989. Cooperation and conflict between voluntary agencies and government in Switzerland. In : Danièle Joly and Robin Cohen (eds.), *Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees*. Aldershot : Avebury.

⁶¹ Cf. for example Gönczy, Michel. 1993. Accueil de réfugiés de contingents en Suisse: Perspectives et interrogations. Manuscript.

⁶² Geert van Dok. 1994. Draft : Positionspapier Kontingentspolitik Caritas. Manuscript.

⁶³ See Caritas, 1995. Documentation on the integration of new personnel in RCS Refugee Services. Quota policy/integration centre. Manuscript.

⁶⁴ see for example:

Alan Phillips, 1989. Employment as a key to settlement. In: Danièle Joly and Robin Cohen (eds.), *Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees*. Aldershot, Avebury.

Carl-Ulrik Shierup and Aleksandra Alund, 1987. Will They Still Be Dancing? Integration and Ethnic Transformation among Yugoslav Immigrants in Scandinavia. Graphic Systems, Göteborg, p. 91.

Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1973. *Soziologie des Fremdarbeiterproblems. Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse am Beispiel der Schweiz*. Enke, Stuttgart.

With reference to quota refugees, see: Danièle Joly, 1996. *An Agenda for Reception and Settlement*. Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, Warwick. (Manuscript)

⁶⁵ See Koichi Koizumi, 1991. Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees in Japan (1975-1981). An analysis and model for future services. In: *Journal of Refugee Studies* 4(2): 182-199.

⁶⁶ See references in: Isabelle Derungs, Stefan Enggist, Simone Gretler and Christine Kopp, 1991. ... dass Du Dich in mein Land verliebst. Vietnamese refugees in the reception centre at Neuenegg. Seminar paper with collection of data, submitted to the Ethnological Seminar at the University of Berne, under Prof. H.-R. Wicker. (Manuscript)

⁶⁷ Corina Salis Gross, 1994. *Integrationsbegleitung anerkannter iranischer Flüchtlinge in der Schweiz - Evaluation der Beratungsstelle für iranische Flüchtlinge und Erhebung zu den Integrationsprozessen der IranerInnen*. Study commissioned by Refugee Welfare of the Swiss Red Cross and executed at the Ethnological Institute of the University of Berne under the direction of Prof. H.-R. Wicker and with the participation of Navideh Fröhlich-Azali. (Manuscript)

⁶⁸ Corina Salis Gross, op. cit., p. 32.

⁶⁹ Corina Salis Gross, op. cit., p. 45.

⁷⁰ Corina Salis Gross, op. cit., p. 61.

⁷¹ Corina Salis Gross, op. cit., p. 64.

⁷² Corina Salis Gross, op. cit., p. 89.

⁷³ Corina Salis Gross, op. cit., p. 95.

⁷⁴ So far, there have been monographs on Chilean, Vietnamese and Tibetan quota refugees. See:

Claudio Bolzmann, 1993. *Les métamorphoses de la barque. Les politiques d'asile, d'insertion et de retour de la Suisse à l'égard des exilés chiliens*. Les éditions IES, no. 2, Geneva.

Kathrin Oester and Beda Marthy, 1984. *Zur Integration von Indochinaflüchtlingen in der Schweiz*. In: Hugo Huber (éd.), *Asiatische Flüchtlinge in der Schweiz: Fragen zur Integration*. Universitätsverlag (Studia Ethnographica Friburgensia 12), Fribourg.

Jacques Mettraux, 1989. *Identité et intégration des réfugiés vietnamiens à Fribourg*. Mémoire de licence en Lettres présenté à l'Institut d'Ethnologie de l'Université de Neuchâtel. (Manuscript).

For information on Tibetan refugees, see the bibliography in: Martin Brauen et Detlef Kantowsky (eds.), 1982. *Junge Tibeter in der Schweiz - Studien zum Prozess kultureller Identifikation*. Joint project of the University of Constance and the Ethnological Museum at the University of Zurich. Rüegger, Chur.

⁷⁵ For statistical proof, see: Etienne Piguet, Roland Misteli, Andreas Wimmer (direction), 1996. *L'intégration des requérants d'asile et des réfugiés sur le marché du travail. Rapport de recherche, phase I et II. Une recherche*